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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The treatment of housing in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is one of the more 
vexing problems for theorists, official statisticians, central bankers and other users. 
Among European countries, for example, in Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, owner-occupied housing services have been 
excluded from the CPI. This is also the situation of the Harmonized Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP), the official indicator of inflation in the EU produced by 
Eurostat. The economic importance of housing services in household budgets makes 
this position a provisional solution.1 This paper presents new evidence from Spain 
about the possibility of using the rental equivalent approach to determine the weight 
that non-rental housing services should have in the CPI. Two radically different 
versions of this approach lead to practically indistinguishable inflation rates for the 
1985-2000 period. In comparison, dropping those services from the CPI leads to a 
considerable bias of about 0.35% per year in the measurement of inflation. 
To introduce the issues involved, assume that a CPI of the usual type, that is, a 
fixed-weights, Laspeyres statistical price index for a whole country must be 
constructed. In a world in which all housing dwellings were rented in perfectly 
competitive markets, there would be no argument about how to treat this commodity 
in the CPI. The difficulty arises, of course, as soon as there is a large owner-occupied 
                                        
1 Recently, pressure to improve upon this situation has been also forthcoming from those who ask for 
asset prices, and especially housing stock prices, to have a role in the measurement of inflation. See the 
analysis and the references quoted in Goodhart (2001, p.F353), who forcefully concludes that “…the 
appropriate methodology for incorporating measures of housing price inflation into our overall statistics 
for inflation remains an urgent and important issue. It cannot be dismissed or ignored. It has to be 
addressed.”  
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housing sector. In the absence of observable transactions between owners and users 
of housing services, it is not obvious at all how to determine the weight to be given 
to owner-occupied housing in the CPI, or exactly which prices should be monitored 
over time. 
What is to be done? As is well known, the cost-of-living (COL) index is a price 
index that measures the change in consumption costs required to maintain a constant 
standard of living. From now on, accept that the theory of the COL index –or what is 
known as the economic approach to index number theory- provides the conceptual 
framework for the country’s CPI.2 This approach suggests that the relevant 
commodity to be included in the CPI is the flow of housing services provided by the 
owner-occupied stock. As Triplett (2001, p. F327) indicates, “The concept of 
consumption implies that the standard of living depends on the consumption of 
housing services, and not on the purchase of houses”.3 
Conceptually, to price the service flow provided by the non-rental housing 
stock one can follow what is known as the rental equivalent approach that consists of 
two parts.4 First, to impute a value to the flow of housing services provided by the 
non-rental dwellings during the CPI’s base period, there are two alternatives. One 
                                        
2 This is actually the case in the U.S., Netherlands, and Sweden (see United States Department of Labor 
1997, Balk 1994, and Dalen 1999). The advantage of the COL approach is that it provides guidance based 
on consumption theory in practical issues like this. For in-depth discussions of the superiority of this 
position versus the ‘not COL’ approach advocated by Hill (1997) and Turvey (1999), see Triplett (2001) 
and Diewert (2000). For alternatives to the COL approach in the housing sector, such as the net 
acquisition and payment approaches, see the International Labour Organization (ILO) manual (Turvey et 
al. 1989), and Turvey (2000). 
3 As a matter of fact, the same problem arises with dwellings facilitated to the occupant as wages in kind 
or as a result of a public or a private transfer. Thus, in the sequel we will always refer to the entire non-
rental housing stock. 
4  As pointed out in Diewert (2000), the rental equivalent approach can be traced back to Marshall (1897, 
p. 594) at least, and it is the approach taken for owner-occupied housing by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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could simply ask occupants (or experts) the rent they think that that the dwellings in 
question could carry in the rental market. This is what is done in Spain in the 
household budget surveys, known as Encuestas de Presupuestos Familiares (EPF), 
gathered by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) with the main purpose of 
estimating the official weights of the Spanish CPI. Alternatively, from information 
collected on housing characteristics for the whole stock and observed rents in the 
market rental sector, rental values for non-rental housing in the base period can be 
estimated using hedonic regression methods. Second, changes in non-rental housing 
costs can be conceivably estimated by changes in rents for housing of similar 
characteristics in the market rental sector.5 
The appropriateness of the COL approach to price index practice has been 
repeatedly questioned by some statistical agencies.6 The usual objection has usually 
taken two complementary forms. It is often said that rent controls or public 
subsidized rents interfere with the workings of the rental housing sector, and/or that 
the characteristics of the dwellings of a very thin market rental sector are not 
representative of those of a very large non-rental housing stock. Spain is a case in 
point. The market rental sector includes all privately owned dwellings rented after a 
1964 law that liberalized first contracts on vacant units, and allowed the introduction 
of rent actualization clauses in contracts that retained an automatic renewal clause at 
                                                                                                                           
in the construction of the CPI in the U.S. since 1983 (see Gillingham and Lane, 1982), and by most 
countries in the world in the system of National Accounts (see Eurostat et al., 1993). 
5  Within the economic approach, an alternative way of estimating the opportunity costs of non-rental 
housing is the user cost approach. See, for instance, Smith et al. (1988), Diewert (2000) and Triplett (2001), 
as well as note 35. 
6 According to Triplett (2001, p.327), “Beyond the rhetoric, the issue that drives much statistical 
uneasiness over the concept of the COL is the treatment of owner-occupied housing…It is perhaps an 
oversimplification to say that empirical problems in estimating the flow of services for owner-occupied 
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the tenant’s discretion. However, part of the housing stock is still under the influence 
of compulsory renewal clauses and rent controls established during the 1920-1964 
period. There is also a publicly subsidized rental housing sector. The vast majority of 
the housing stock is owner-occupied, and the percentage represented by the market 
rental housing sector during the last 25 years is only between 5-15% of the total stock. 
Nevertheless, the self-imputed rental values obtained in the 1973-74 and 1980-81 
EPFs were used to determine the weight to be given to non-rental housing in the CPI 
system based on 1976 and 1983, respectively.7 However, possibly because the prices 
of the housing stock had been through an upward cycle since Spain joined the 
European Union in 1986, the self-imputed values collected in the 1990-91 EPF were 
thought to be too high, and the non-rental sector was eliminated from the CPI system 
based on 1992.8  
Therefore, the scene is set for the experiment conducted in this paper. In the 
first place, the hedonic approach to the task of imputing rental values to non-rental 
housing is applied to the information in the 1980-81 and 1990-91 EPFs. After a 
comparison with the traditional one, the hedonic procedure advocated in this paper 
consists of three steps. First, an index of housing quality is constructed by applying 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis to a set of physical attributes, or structural 
characteristics for the entire housing stock. Second, market rents are explained in 
terms of the housing quality index and geographical variables, controlling for the 
                                                                                                                           
housing have induced rejection of the COL index framework, but there is nevertheless considerable truth 
in the oversimplification”. 
7 Self-imputations by occupants and expert judgments are also currently used in the U.S. and the 
Netherlands, respectively, to determine the official weight assigned to owner-occupied housing in the 
CPI.  
8  See Castro (1992), the spokesman for the INE at the time. 
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inverse relationship between a dwelling’s observed rent and the number of years that 
it has been occupied. Third, after controlling for the possible selection bias induced 
by differences in housing characteristics between the market rental sector and the 
non-rental segment of the housing stock, these regression results are used to impute 
a rental value to each non-rental housing unit. 
In the second place, to assess the plausibility of the two available versions of 
the rental equivalence approach favored in this paper, the hedonic rental values 
(“objectively”) imputed to non-rental housing by the statistical procedures just 
described are compared with the self-imputations (“subjectively”) suggested by the 
occupants.9 Finally, the official inflation since August 1985 to December 2001 
(according to the CPI systems based on 1983 and 1992) is compared with the inflation 
that would have obtained if the CPI weights for non-rental housing in a 57-
dimensional commodity space had been constructed using our hedonic estimates. 
The main empirical findings are the following four. (i) The explanation of rents 
in the post-64 market rental sector is quite satisfactory. After correcting for outliers, 
58% of the variance in 1980-81 and 59% in 1990-91 is explained in terms of the 
housing quality index, two geographical variables and the year of occupancy. It 
should be emphasized that, possibly because of the slow introduction of rent 
actualization clauses, sitting tenants with long contracts enjoy very large discounts 
relative to the rents paid in new contracts signed during the survey period for similar 
housing units. (ii) Dwellings in the market rental and the non-rental housing sectors 
turn out to have rather similar characteristics. Therefore, the estimation of a final 
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model for market rents taking into account the interdependence between the choices 
of tenure mode and housing characteristics is not unduly affected by selection bias. 
(iii) There is broad agreement between the hedonic rental values and the self-
evaluations for non-rental housing services. On average, hedonic values in 1980-81 
are 10% higher, and in 1990-91 15% lower, than self-imputed ones. (iv) This leads to 
the most remarkable result of the paper: using either of the two alternatives to assess 
the importance of non-rental housing in the CPI system has very small consequences 
for inflation. Instead, if the rental equivalence approach is abandoned and non-rental 
housing services are dropped from the CPI, the weight of the “non-rental housing” 
commodity goes down by about 10 percentage points.  As a consequence, inflation 
would be 0.33% per year higher from August 1985 to December 1992, and 0.38% per 
year lower from January 1993 to December 2000.10 
The rest of the paper consists of 5 Sections and an Appendix. Section II presents 
the minimum information on institutional background and data sources that are 
necessary to understand the task at hand. Section III contrasts two alternative 
strategies to the question of explaining market rents within the hedonic approach: the 
traditional one that, together with geographic characteristics and the year of 
occupancy, uses a set of physical attributes as regressors; and a second view in 
which, as explained in the Appendix, a housing quality index is first constructed for 
the entire housing stock applying Multiple Correspondence Analysis to the physical 
attributes. Section IV obtains a final set of regression results that takes into account 
                                                                                                                           
9 This is what is done in Francois (1989) who used the traditional hedonic approach with a sample of 
new tenants only. For his results, see below note 30. 
10 For comparison purposes, recall that when all sources of bias are considered, according to the Boskin 
(1996) Commission the official CPI in the U.S. suffers from and estimated upward bias of 1.1% per year. 
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the possible interdependence between the choices of tenure mode and physical 
attributes. Section V compares the hedonic values imputed to non-rental housing 
with the help of these regression results with the self-imputed values provided by 
their occupants. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA SOURCES 
To understand the problem addressed in this paper, it is essential to classify the 
housing stock according to both tenure mode and the legal status determined by 
government interventions in the housing sector. As far as tenure mode is concerned, 
dwellings occupied by their owners and rented dwellings constitute the owner-
occupied and the rental sector, respectively. In the third mode, occupants do not own 
or rent the dwellings, but use them either as wages in kind, or as a transfer from a 
public organism, a private institution or an individual person. This will be referred 
to as the “Other” mode. 
As indicated in the Introduction, the data sources for this paper are the 1980-81 
and 1990-91 EPFs collected from April 1980 to March 1981, and from April 1990 to 
March 1991, respectively. These two household budget surveys consist of 23,971 and 
21,155 observations, representative of the household population occupying non-
institutional, or residential housing in all of Spain. This population is around 10 
million and 11.3 million households in 1980-81 and 1990-91, respectively. The INE 
provides a set of blowing up factors to convert sample statistics into population 
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statistics.11 The reliability of the housing information provided by the 1980-81 and 
1990-91 EPFs has been assessed in Arévalo (2001) by a comparison, whenever 
possible, with the corresponding information obtained from a 25% sample of the 1981 
and 1991 Housing Censuses.12  
As can be seen in Table 1, both EPFs heavily underestimate the amount of 
secondary housing recorded in the Censuses.13 However, the coverage of 
permanently occupied residential housing by the EPFs is very satisfactory:  
approximately 96% both in 1980-81 relative to the 1981 Census, and in 1990-91 
relative to the 1991 Census. The distribution by tenure mode according to the two 
data sources is very similar in the two periods. Taking also into account that the 
housing information for secondary housing in the EPFs is not as good as for 
permanently occupied residential housing, only the latter will be studied in the 
sequel.14 
Table 1 around here 
In Spain, as in other countries, government intervention in the housing sector 
takes many forms. For our purposes, it will suffice to describe the stylized features of 
two major policies. In the first place, the public sector has entirely financed some 
                                        
11 All the information used in this paper has been made accessible in http://www.eco.uc3m.es/epf80-
81.html and http://www.eco.uc3m.es/epf90-91.html. For sampling methods and a full description of the 
data, see INE (1983, 1992a). 
12 These Censuses investigate the entire housing stock in March 1 1981 and 1991, respectively. See INE 
(1982, 1992b). 
13 As pointed out in Arévalo (2001, Chapter 1), this is partly due to the fact that the Census is dated one 
year after the beginning of the corresponding EPF. Moreover, the EPFs only investigate permanently or 
temporally occupied housing, while the Censuses also cover all unoccupied housing; respondents to the 
Census may very well classify part of the latter as temporally occupied , or secondary housing. 
14 As far as other comparable housing characteristics, relative to the Censuses both EPFs underestimate 
the proportion of residential housing in rural municipalities with less than 2,000 inhabitants. The main 
puzzle has to do with housing age: the proportion of dwellings more than 30 years old is overestimated 
in the 1980-81 EPF, but underestimated in the 1990-91 EPF. 
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housing construction but, starting from the 1950s, most government intervention has 
operated through a variety of programs that provide incentives to housing 
construction by means of moderate direct subsidies, low interest rates and/or fiscal 
credits to the producers. Complex public regulations, the details of which are 
unnecessary to enter into here, mandate that housing built under these policies are 
rented or sold below market prices. In addition, buyers of public housing may have 
access to more favorable financial conditions than if they had acquired their home in 
the unsubsidized private sector. As a result of this type of government intervention, 
housing units in the owner-occupied or the rental sectors will be classified as public 
or private housing. 
Within the owner-occupied sector, all private housing units integrate what 
might be called the market sector. However, due to the public policy known as rent 
control, in the rental sector this is not the case. Together with the compulsory renewal 
clause on all leases, which dates from 1920, a 1946 law systematically froze all rentals 
at the level reached at the time of the first contract, following up on transitory 
regulations in the same vein already in effect in previous years. A 1955 law made a 
dramatic policy change, allowing for an almost unrestricted bargaining on all 
contracts made after May 12, 1956. Further legislation, enforced since July 1, 1964, 
sanctioned and extended that policy change. Lease renewals were still compulsory, 
but rents in new contracts are allowed to be determined by market forces; owners 
and renters were also allowed to include rent revision clauses subject only to annual 
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ceilings set by the government.15 However, for all housing rented before 1964, the 
power of rent revision remained with the government. Although this power has been 
exercised on several occasions since that date, only moderate increases have been 
permitted. Therefore, a distinction must be made between private rental housing 
occupied before or after the crucial date of 1964, giving rise to pre-64 or rent 
controlled housing, and post-64 or market rental housing, respectively. Within the 
period covered in this paper, which extends until 1990-91, legislation enforced since 
April 1986 did away with compulsory renewal clauses and completely liberalized 
the rental sector.16 
Information on the legal status of residential housing is very hard to come by. 
Current occupants may not know or remember whether their dwellings were 
originally constructed under a public program. Consequently, Censuses do not even 
attempt to distinguish between private and public housing. Thus, this statistical 
source does not distinguish either between pre-64 and post-64 private rental housing. 
Fortunately, as can be seen in Table 2, the EPFs provide some partial but valuable 
information about the legal status of housing units in the rental and the owner-
occupied sectors. 
Table 2 around here 
In recent decades, a revolution in tenure modes has taken place in Spain. The 
strict rent control up to 1964, the impediments remaining after the liberalization in 
that date until very recently (compulsory renewal clause and government limits to 
                                        
15 The post-64 situation in Spain belongs to what has been termed second-generation rent control in 
Arnott (1995) or tenancy rent control in Basu and Emerson (2000). 
16 A new law passed in 1995 reinstates some protection to tenants. Annual rent renewal clauses are 
authorized, but tenants can force all contracts to last at least five years.  
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annual rent increases), and the uncertainties created by the possibility of further 
legislative change, have turned the construction industry toward the owner-occupied 
sector. Moreover, a public policy of tax benefits to private suppliers has deliberately 
not worked in the direction of redressing the balance in favor of rental housing. 
Finally, since its inception in 1977 in the midst of the democratic transition started in 
1975, the personal income tax has provided large incentives for the taxpayer to 
channel savings towards housing investments. As a result of these factors, according 
to Census data the share of rental housing has declined from 52% in 1950, to 30% in 
1970, 21% in 1980, and 15% in 2000. 
Against this background, the problem addressed in Sections III and IV is how to 
use the information on housing characteristics and rents in the market rental sector 
(row 1 in Table 2, i.e., 2,181 and 1,061 observations in 1980-81 and 1990-91, 
respectively), to impute a rental value to all housing units in the non-rental housing 
sector for which the EPFs provide self-imputations made by their occupants (rows 5 
to 7 and row III in Table 2, or 18,487 and 18,180 observations in 1980-81 and 1990-91, 
respectively). 
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III. EXPLAINING MARKET RENTS WITHIN THE HEDONIC APPROACH 
 
This section consists of three parts. The first one introduces the statistical model 
associated with the traditional hedonic approach to the explanation of market rents in 
terms of physical attributes and location or geographical variables. As time goes by, 
some housing units become vacant while others remain occupied. It is shown that, as 
long as rent increases incorporated in new contracts for vacant units are not exactly 
matched through rent renewal clauses in old contracts for dwellings already 
occupied, the year of occupancy would have to be included as an explanatory 
variable of the survey year market rents.  
The second part presents the empirical models for the 1980-81 and 1990-91 
Spanish samples. With regard to the first group of variables, namely, the physical 
attributes, two alternatives are contrasted in 1980-81: (a) the standard hedonic model 
in which all physical attributes enter linearly in the regression but no interaction 
between them and the year of occupancy is considered, and (b) a model in which the 
housing quality index constructed in the Appendix is substituted for the set of 
physical attributes and interactions between the index and the year of occupancy are 
included. Given its superiority on statistical grounds, only the second approach is 
applied in the 1990-91 case. The estimation process is completed in all cases with a 
diagnostic analysis, based on Peña and Yohai (1995), to detect potentially influential 
observations, to actually measure their influence in the regression results, and to 
assess their statistical significance as outliers. The final part of the section provides 
an economic interpretation of the empirical results. 
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III.1 The Statistical Model Associated With the Hedonic Approach 
 
In the hedonic approach to the study of heterogeneous, differentiated 
commodities, unobservable quality differences between two product varieties are 
assumed to be well approximated by a set of observable physical attributes. This 
provided the original rationale to explain product prices in terms of product 
characteristics. Rosen (1974) establishes the microeconomic foundations of the 
approach by means of a perfect competitive model in which the price of an 
indivisible, differentiated product is jointly determined by the interaction of supply 
and demand of the product’s attributes. Although the underlying demand and 
supply behavioral relations cannot be identified from the knowledge of product 
prices and product characteristics, partial derivatives with respect to each 
characteristic in a hedonic regression can be interpreted as the implicit marginal 
equilibrium price of the attribute in question.17 
Let At be the annual rent in year t of those dwellings in the market rental sector 
whose first contract is made in that same year. Assume that the model for At is  
   At = F(t, ct, xt), 
where ct = [c1t, c2t] is the set of physical (c1t) and geographical (c2t) attributes of 
housing units first rented in year t, and xt is a white noise random term, normally 
distributed with E[xt] = 0, Var[xt] = s2x, and Cov[xt,xt’] = 0 for all t and t’. Consider 
                                        
17  See Quigley (1979) for a survey of the early literature, and Sheppard (1999) for a recent one. Triplett 
(1990) contains a guide to the approach, as well as an illuminating account of why statistical offices 
have resisted its use for 30 years. Currently, after their success in the U.S. in the analysis of quality 
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the same housing distribution in the current period, cT, and, for simplicity, assume 
away all ageing effects. As long as ct = cT, E[AT/cT] = E[At/ct] only if there is no 
inflation in the housing sector. Assuming for illustrative purposes a constant rate p  of 
housing inflation, we have 
   E[AT/cT] = E[At/ct] (1 + p).    (1) 
Let Lt be the subset of size Nt of those dwellings first occupied in year t which 
remain currently occupied in year T > t, and denote by at the vector of current rents 
in T. Assume that 
   at = f(t, Xt, et),       (2) 
where Xt = [X1t, X2t] with X1tÎc1t and X2tÎc2t are the characteristics of the subset Lt, 
and et is a white noise random term, normally distributed with E [et] = 0, Var [et] = 
s2e, and Cov (et,et’) = 0 for all t and t’. Notice that E[at] = E[At/ct = Xt] only if there is 
a rent freeze. In practice, At grows in time as a consequence of rent renewal clauses. 
Denoting by D the mean rate of rent increase due to renewal clauses from t to T, we 
have 
   E[at] = E[At/ct = Xt] (1 + D).     (3) 
Comparing (1) and (3) it is easy to see that, on average, it would be indifferent to rent 
the housing stock with characteristics Xt in the current period T or in year t, if and 
                                                                                                                           
change in the context of the CPI, hedonic methods are at least widely discussed in statistical offices 
around the world. 
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only if renewal clauses exactly capture the impact of inflation. In this case, the mean 
impact of the year of occupancy on at would be zero. Otherwise, the year of 
occupancy should be an explanatory variable of the rent actually paid in year T of 
housing occupied in year t, as indicated in equation (2). 
There are good reasons to expect a negative mean impact of the year of 
occupancy on present rents, meaning that owners would be giving up a discount to 
sitting tenants renewing their rents, relative to the rents charged in new contracts for 
housing of the same characteristics. In the first place, there are theoretical models 
yielding what is known as tenure discounts.18  Landlords know that tenants will incur 
moving costs if they leave the unit. However, several factors work in the opposite 
direction. First, landlords also incur costs when a tenant moves out of a unit, 
including the cost of reconditioning, the cost of marketing a vacancy, and the rental 
income forgone during the vacancy. Second, landlords may want to retain current 
tenants that have shown during some period to be “good” tenants, minimizing wear 
and tear, avoiding trouble with neighbors, etc. Third, there could be a tenant’s 
decreasing willingness to pay with the passage of time. Thus, tenure discounts may 
appear as an equilibrium phenomenon in the game played by tenants and landlords. 
In the second place, it should be remembered that, in the Spanish case, new contracts 
signed between 1964 and 1986 have an automatic clause compelling landlords not to 
evict tenants up to two generations but in a very restricted set of circumstances. This 
shifts considerable bargaining power towards tenants in the rent renewal process, 
leading presumably to large tenant discounts (see Börsch-Supan 1986, Nagy 1997, 
                                        
18  See, inter alia, Guasch and Marshall (1987) and Hubert (1995). 
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and Basu and Emerson 2000). Moreover, rent increases for sitting tenants had to 
comply with an annual governmental ceiling, typically linked to the previous year’s 
housing inflation rate.  
Therefore, as Hoffman and Kurz (20002) conclude, both the peculiarities of 
housing markets and the regulations may result in tenancy discounts, which may 
cause a kind of lock-in effect with local non-substitution, since old contracts are not 
available to potential new tenants, and new contracts may not be attractive to sitting 
tenants, even if the old unit does not suit their needs anymore. At any rate, there is 
ample empirical evidence on tenure discounts in several countries under different 
legal arrangements.19  
 
III.2. Empirical Results 
 
There are three sets of empirical results corresponding to (i) a traditional 
hedonic model for 1980-81 that explains market rents in terms physical attributes, 
geographic characteristics and year of occupancy; (ii)   a hedonic model for that 
sample in which the physical attributes are replaced by the housing quality index 
constructed in the Appendix, and (iii) a hedonic model of the latter type for 1990-91. 
 
The Standard Hedonic Model Without Interactions Between Physical Attributes and the Year 
of Occupancy, 1980-81 
 
Assume that in 1980-81 there is a sample consisting of nt observations, with nt < 
Nt, of housing units first rented at time t = 1965,…, 1980-81, so that the sample size is 
                                        
19 For the U.S., see for instance, Lowry (1981), Goodman and Kawai (1985) and Clark and Heskin (1982). 
For Germany, see Börsch-Supan (1986), Schlitch (1983) and Hoffman Kurz (2002). For Spain, see Peña 
and Ruiz-Castillo (1984). 
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n = St nt < N = St Nt. Denote by a = Èt{at} the set of rents actually paid in 1980-81, X1 
= Èt{X1t} the set of physical housing attributes, X2 = Èt{X2t} the set of geographic 
characteristics, X = [X1, X2] the set of housing characteristics of both types, and X3 = 
{Ocup65, Ocup66,…, Ocup80-81} an index set of years of occupancy where, for each 
t, Ocupt = 1 if the housing unit was first rented in year t and Ocupt = 0 otherwise. 
Each housing observation, indexed by i = 1,…, n, can be described by 
  (ai, Xi, X3i) Î a x X x X3. 
Assume for the time being that the impact of physical and geographic 
characteristics on rents is independent of the year the housing unit was first rented. 
That is, in terms of equation (2), assume that ¶f/¶Xt = ¶f/¶Xt’ for all t ¹ t’. Under this 
simplifying assumption, rather than working with 16 separate models at = f(t, Xt, et), 
t = 1965,…, 1980-81,  it is possible to work with a single one: 
  a = g(X, X3, e),       (4) 
where e is a normally distributed random term with E[e] = 0 and Var[e] = se2. 
According to the 1980-81 EPF, the number of housing units in the post-64 or 
market rental sector is 2,181 (see row 1 in Table 2). However, in 18 cases there is no 
rent information, while in 21 cases there is no information on the building age. After 
dropping these 39 observations, the actual sample size becomes 2,142, representative 
of 867,627 population units. Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in 
Table 3.  
Table 3 around here 
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There are 7 structural characteristics in the set X1, including 5 discrete variables 
whose categories are always ordered so that the more desirable ones are assigned 
higher numbers. There are 3 categories of hygienic services (after some aggregation 
of an original list of 7 categories); 4 categories describing water facilities; 3 categories 
describing heating facilities, and 2 dummy variables indicating the presence of 
garage and telephone, respectively. The two continuous variables are housing area, 
measured in square meters, and building age, measured by the number of years 
between 1980 and the construction year. In Table 3, both variables have been 
discretized into 4 and 5 categories, respectively. There are two geographical 
variables in the set X2: municipal size, measured by the number of inhabitants, and 
the province where the dwelling is located. The 52 Spanish provinces have been 
classified into 4 groups, described in Table 3, having a similar mean housing price 
per square meter in 2002 (see Ministerio de Fomento 2002: 
http/www.mfom.estadisticas). Table 3 also includes the 16 dummy variables 
describing the distribution by year of first occupancy. For each variable, the 
population frequency and the mean monthly rent paid in 1980-81 (in euros) within 
each category is provided. In all cases, the more desirable the category, the larger the 
mean rent paid during the survey year is. 
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The inspection of the sample rent distribution conducted in Arévalo (2001), as 
well as the residuals of some preliminary linear specification of model (5), led to the 
following semi-logarithmic functional form with parameters (a, b , g)20: 
   ln a = a + X b  + St gt ocupt + e.     (5) 
Table 4 contains the results of the estimation by OLS with robust standard errors of 4 
versions of this general specification. To begin with, only the effect of variables in X = 
[X1, X2] is studied. After some experimentation with alternative discretizations of all 
variables, it turns out that the logarithm of housing size (Lnsize) and the building age 
(Age) should enter in continuous form, but the following categories in Table 3 are 
non-significant: Heat2, Mun5, Prov1, Prov2, and Prov3. Therefore, they are all 
eliminated from the regression so that they only affect the constant in Model I. The 
remaining 14 variables (except the presence of garage and telephone facilities) are 
significant and appear with the expected sign (see below for a discussion of the role 
of each of them in the final Model IV). 
Table 4 around here 
The next step is devoted to the effect of the year of first occupancy. Model II 
includes 15 dummy variables, Ocupt with t = 65,…, 79. This reduces the mean square 
error of Model I by 11%, and raises the R2 from 0.361 up to 0.499. As far as the effect 
on the X1 and X2 variables, the coefficients’ size are slightly reduced in absolute 
terms in all cases, except for the variable Phone that becomes significant. Except for 
                                        
20 There is a large literature on the appropriate choice of functional form for the hedonic price function 
(see the discussion in Sheppard 1999, for example), but the simple log-linear form generally performs 
well. 
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Ocup79, all other occupational dummies have a significant effect on rents with the 
expected sign, indicating the existence of sizable tenure discounts. In absolute terms, 
except for Ocup65 and Ocup70 the further into the past the year of occupancy, the 
larger the gt coefficient is, but the observed differences do not justify such a large 
disaggregation level. The residuals of Model I are positively related to the number of 
years of occupation, with a stronger relationship since 1974 (not shown here). The 
relationship in Table 3 between mean rent values paid in 1980-81 and years of 
occupancy also shows two discontinuities at 1974 and 1978. To simplify the way in 
which this important variable enters into the analysis, Arévalo (2001) distinguished 
its effect during the sub-periods 1965-1973, 1974-1977, and 1978-1980 by means of 6 
variables: 3 dummy variables, each of which takes the value 1 in one of the sub-
periods and 0 otherwise; and 3 continuous variables, each of which is equal to the 
number of years of occupancy during the relevant sub-period and zero outside of it.21 
After some experimentation (whose results are available on request), it was found 
that it is unnecessary to distinguish the third sub-period. Therefore, the best 
specification, shown in Model III, includes a single dummy variable Ocup6573 (so 
that the dummy eliminated from the regression equation is Ocup7480), and 2 
continuous variables, Year6573 and Years7480. The goodness of fit of this model is 
similar to the one for Model II, but there are 12 fewer parameters to estimate. The 
regression coefficients of the X1 and X2 variables remain essentially constant. 
                                        
21 Thus, for example, a housing unit first rented in 1970 is characterized by a value of 1 in the dummy 
Ocup6573, a value of 10 in the continuous variable Years6573, and a value of 0 in each of the 2 
remaining dummy variables, Ocup7477 and Ocup7880, and the 2 remaining continuous variables 
Years7477 and Years7880. 
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According to Peña and Yohai’s (1995) method, there are 90 influential 
observations, or 4.2% of the sample, that can be considered outliers22. Model IV in 
Table 4 is the final model after deleting all outliers. The mean square error is reduced 
by 16.4%, while the R2 rises up to 0.586. Except for Water4 and Mun3, the precision 
with which all X1 and X2 variables are estimated is improved upon and the presence 
of garage facilities becomes significant. 
 
The Hedonic Model With a Quality Index, 1980-81 
 
As explained in the Appendix, an (ordinal) housing quality index (Qindex) that 
summarizes the physical attributes has been constructed. Consider the regression 
equation where this index substitutes for the vector X1 of physical characteristics: 
   ln a = a + b  + X2 b 2 + St gt ocupt + n.  
 (6) 
In this model, consistent with the hedonic approach, the b coefficient can be 
interpreted as the implicit marginal equilibrium price of housing quality. 
There are several a priori reasons why this approach should be preferred to the 
traditional one. 
(i) It permits overcoming the multicollinearity problem that may disturb the 
precise estimation of the physical attributes in vector X1 (recall, for example, that the 
category Heat2 had to be removed from the regression because it was non-
significant).  
                                        
22 There are 40 observations with a t value between 3 and 5, 35 observations with a t between 5 and 7, 
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(ii) It permits estimating the impact of housing characteristics that, due to their 
infrequency, would have no explanatory power in the traditional approach. For 
example, in 1990-91 only 6 out of 1,026 housing units in the rental market sector have 
swimming pool facilities. In the second approach, this attribute may influence market 
rents through its effect on the housing quality index. 
(iii) By construction, the quality index is uncorrelated with the remaining 
indicators in the Multiple Correspondence Analysis. In so far as these indicators are 
orthogonal to housing quality, they should have no explanatory power of a unit’s 
market rent. Thus, using only Qindex in equation (6) filters possibly irrelevant 
information as far as explaining market rents is concerned. 
(iv)  To have a single variable, makes the study of interactions between the 
variables synthesized in the index and other explanatory variables considerably 
easier. As it will   be seen below, this is the case in this context with respect to the 
year of occupancy. 
Table 5 presents three regression models using Qindex in place of the 10 X1 
variables that were found significant before (see Table 3 for some descriptive 
statistics of this new variable). Model A also includes the geographical variables in 
X2, as well as the best specification found before for the year of occupancy. The 
comparison of this model with Model 3 shows that, in spite of the reduction of the 
number of parameters, the goodness of fit is essentially preserved. The role of the 
geographical variables in both models is also very similar. 
Table 5 around here 
                                                                                                                           
and 15 with a t greater than 7. 
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So far, in both approaches it has been assumed that the impact of the physical 
characteristics, or of Qindex, on rents is independent of the year the housing unit was 
first rented. Of course, in the traditional approach this assumption can be verified by 
interacting the variables in X1 with the year of occupancy. However, as anticipated in 
point (iv) above, the search for an interaction pattern should be much simpler with a 
single variable, Qindex, than with 10 of them. After some exploration in Arévalo 
(2001) –whose results are available upon request- the best specification is achieved 
by substituting two variables for Qindex: Qindex6573 = Qindex if tÎ[1965, 1973] and 
0 otherwise, and Qindex7480 = Qindex if tÎ[1974, 1980] and 0 otherwise (see Table 3 
for some descriptive statistics).  The regression results, presented in Model B in 
Table 5, show that the positive relationship between market rent and housing quality 
is not constant over time, since it is distinctly stronger when the housing unit is 
rented after 1973. On the other hand, the coefficient for the dummy variable 
Ocup6573 remains negative but is not significant. 
Interestingly enough, the application of Peña and Yohai’s (1995) procedure 
yields exactly the same 90 outliers already detected in the first approach. After 
deleting all the outliers, the results are in Model C of Table 5. The mean squared 
error is reduced by 16.2%, while the R2 increases up to 0.578. Except for Mun3, the 
precision with which all variables are estimated increases and Ocup6573 becomes 
again significant. 
 
The Hedonic Model With a Quality Index, 1990-91 
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Descriptive statistics for all variables in X1, X2, and X3 are presented in Table 6. 
As we have just seen, using only Qindex in 1980-81 as in equation (6), rather than the 
10 variables in X1as in equation (5), considerably reduces the number of parameters 
to be estimated without damaging the regression’s goodness of fit, and makes it 
much easier to model the interaction between housing quality and year of first 
occupancy. As can be seen in Table 6, besides the 8 housing characteristics included 
in 1980-81, in 1990-91 there is information on 10 more physical attributes. Therefore, 
the above advantages are expected to be even more important in this case. This 
justifies adopting the Qindex approach in 1990-91. 
Table 6 around here 
Model A in Table 7 uses the available observations in the market rental sector, 
namely, 1,061 observations (see row 1 in Table 2), less 19 without information on rent, 
and 7 without information on building age; that is, a total of 1,035 observations 
representative of 590,948 housing units at the population level. As before, the hardest 
issue is how to model the year of occupancy’s effect. Preliminary explorations 
indicate different behavior during 3 different sub-periods. This leads to 3 continuous 
variables, Years6575, Years7682, and Years8390, as well as 3 dummy variables 
Ocup6575, Ocup7682, and Ocup8390.23 Correspondingly, to capture the interaction 
between housing quality and year of occupancy, 3 variables Qindex6575, 
Qindex7682, and Qindex8390 were created. As shown in Model A in Table 7, the best 
specification joins the variables Years7682 and Years8390 into a single one, called 
                                        
23 Thus, for example a dwelling first rented in 1980 is characterized by a value of 10 in Years7682, a value 
of 1 in Ocup7682, and a value of 0 in the remaining variables. 
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Years7690. According to Peña and Yohai’s  (1995) method, there are 53 influential 
observations, or 5.1% of the sample, that can be considered outliers.24 Model B in 
Table 6 is the final one after deleting all outliers. The mean square error is reduced 
by 15.6%, while the R2 raises up to 0.592. Except for Years6575 and Qindex8390, 
which remain nevertheless highly significant, the precision with which all variables 
are estimated is improved upon and Years7690 and Ocup6575 become significant. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of the geographical variables in Model B display a 
similar pattern to the one shown in Table 5 for the 1980-81case. 
Table 7 around here 
III.3. Economic Interpretation 
 
First, consider the traditional hedonic model IV in Table 4 for the 1980-81 
sample. Individual coefficients provide a rich explanation of market rents. Starting 
with physical attributes, (a) to have less (or more) than one full bathroom leads to a 
21.8% smaller (or to a 43.8% greater) estimated rent than in the reference situation. (b) 
Relative to having hot water from an individual system, centrally heated hot water 
increases rents by 33.4%, but to have no water at all or to have only cold water 
reduces rents by 40.0% and 20.9%, respectively. (c) Central heating increases rents by 
25.6%, while the presence of (d) garage and (e) telephone facilities increases rents by 
15.3% and 11.9%, respectively. (f) The dwelling size elasticity is 0.23, so that a 10% 
increase in size leads to an estimated 2.3% increase in rent. (g) The age of the 
building reduces rents by 0.3% per year.  
                                        
24 There are 33 observations with a t value between 3 and 5, 13 observations with a t between 5 and 7, 
and 7 with a t greater than 7. 
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When the 10 significant physical attributes are replaced by the housing quality 
index (see Model C in Table 5), it is observed that, as expected, greater quality 
implies larger market rents. This relationship between quality and rent is also 
preserved in 1990-91. However, the interaction between housing quality and year of 
occupancy displays opposite patterns in the two samples, a feature to which we will 
return below. At this juncture, notice that, as far as the geographical variables are 
concerned, the observed pattern is practically the same in all models: first, the greater 
the population of the municipality where the unit is located, the higher the estimated 
rent is; second, in 1980-81 rents are higher in Madrid, Barcelona and the other 
provinces where the housing stock has a mean price in 2002 higher than 1,700 euro 
per squared meter, while in 1990-91 rents are lower in those provinces where the 
housing stock has a mean price at that date lower than 860 euro per squared meter. 
As has been noted above, the rent actualization process via rent renewal clauses 
for sitting tenants may proceed more slowly than rent increases in new contracts due 
to inflation. According to the hedonic model IV in Table 4, the annual discount 
generated by the difference between the sector’s inflation and the actualization 
clauses is 3.9% during 1965-73 and 12.7% during 1974-1980. The accumulated 
discounts on rents of dwellings of average quality occupied in different years, 
relative to units of the same quality first rented in 1980, are presented in column 1 in 
Table 8. They are very large indeed, ranging from 12% in a single year for units 
rented in 1979 to 70.1% for units first occupied in 1965. The accumulated discounts 
by year of occupancy according to model B in Table 5, where physical attributes are 
replaced by a single quality index, are presented in column 2 of Table 8. These refer 
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to a unit of average quality with Qindex = 2.38 located in the area where housing 
stock prices are highest. The direct effects due to the year of occupancy are 
practically the same as in the traditional hedonic model, but  model B includes an 
additional effect due to the interaction between housing quality and year of 
occupancy. As a result, the accumulated discounts are now slightly larger than 
before.25 
Table 8 around here 
To evaluate these results, it is necessary to turn our attention to the inflation 
that took place during this period in the housing rental sector. The Spanish INE 
measures the inflation rate of a sample of rental units that may include both private 
dwellings rented before 1964 and public housing dwellings, whose rents need not 
vary as those of private units rented after 1964.26 The official inflation rate, 
reproduced in column 6 in Table 8, shows a structural change in 1973. The mean 
inter-annual inflation rate is 5.8% during 1965-72 and 12.5% during 1973-1980. Due to 
inflation, rents of dwellings of a given quality indexed at a value of 100 in 1965 
would be 379.5 in 1980. If the occupants of those dwellings had enjoyed no rent 
actualization at all, they would have received an accumulated discount of 73.6% 
relative to the rent these units would have had in 1980, a figure very close to the ones 
in columns 1 and 2 in Table 8. The implication is that, relative to the inflation 
recorded in the entire rental sector, the estimated rent actualizations through renewal 
clauses from 1965 to 1980 have been negligible. 
                                        
25 Interestingly enough, the discount estimated in Peña and Ruiz-Castillo (1983) for a sample of housing 
units rented in the Madrid Metropolitan Area in 1975, is 8% per year. The accumulated discount for the 
1965-1975 period is 56.56%, a larger figure than those of columns 1 and 2 in Table 8. 
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In 1990 things start to change (see Model B in Table 7). The direct effect of the 
year of occupancy has two structural changes in 1975 and 1982, but now the annual 
discounts decrease with time: they are 6.6% in 1965-75, and 2.7% in 1976-1990. 
Likewise, the coefficients of the quality index tend to decrease with time in the 
corresponding sub-periods. As a result, the accumulated discounts for dwellings of 
average quality (Qindex = 15.46) in the more expensive provinces first rented in 
years close to 1990 grow more slowly than what was observed before for years close 
to 1980 (see column 4 in Table 8). It would appear that, with the passage of time, an 
increasing number of new contracts do include rent renewal clauses. Nevertheless, 
the evidence of tenure discounts remains impressive. In particular, taking into 
account the official inflation rates, rents of dwellings indexed at a value of 100 in 1965 
would be 85.94 in 1990. This means that, without any actualization at all, those units 
would have received an accumulated discount of 88.2% relative to the unit’s rent in 
1990, a figure still very close to the 83.5% estimated with our model. 
 
IV. IMPUTING MONEY VALUES TO NON-RENTAL DWELLINGS 
Given the regression results in Model C in Table 5 and Model B in Table 7 for 
1980-81 and 1990-91, respectively, the next task is to impute in each survey year a 
monetary value to the flow of housing services provided by non-rental dwellings, 
namely, owner-occupied and transferred housing. However, if the choices of tenure 
mode and housing characteristics are not independent, the OLS estimation in the 
market rental sector might be inconsistent, as well as unbiased.  
                                                                                                                           
26 For the difficulties and possible bias in the measurement of rent inflation in the rental housing 
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In order to deal with this problem, we begin by recognizing that the total 
sample of housing units, indexed by i = 1,…, N, consists of two sets of observations: 
uncensored ones in the set {i = 1,…, Nê iÎL}, where L denotes the set of market 
rental units; and censored observations in {i = 1,…, Nê iÏL} for which market rents ai 
are obviously not observed. Let z* be the latent variable that determines the sample 
selection and it is only observable when z* ³ 0, and let I be an indicator variable 
defined by 
   Ii = 1 Û iÎL Û zi* ³ 0, and Ii = 0 Û iÏL Û zi* < 0.  
In this situation, if f(a, z*) is the joint density function of the random variables a and 
z* and Pr(z* ³ 0) is the probability of belonging to the set L, then the observable 
conditional density demand function is 
   f(a, z*ê z* ³ 0) = f(a, z*)/Pr(z* ³ 0). 
The implication is that the regression model (6) has to be reformulated 
introducing a selection mechanism for z*. That is to say, we now have: 
   ln ai = Yib  + ni, if i ÎL,      (7) 
and 
   zi* = Zig  + ui, 
where, for all i, Yi is a vector that includes the variables that have been shown to have 
a significant explanatory role in the previous section, namely a constant, the 
geographical variables, the year of occupancy variables, the housing quality index 
and its interactions with the year of occupancy; n is normally distributed with E[ni] = 
                                                                                                                           
component of the CPI, see Randolph (1988), and Hoffman and Kurz (2002). 
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0 and s[ni] = sn; Zi is the set of variables that permit classifying each housing unit 
according to its tenure mode, and u is a normally distributed variable with E[ui] = 0 
and s[ui] = 1. Therefore, 
   Pr(iÎL) = Pr(Ii = 1) = F(Zig)  and Pr(iÏL) = Pr(Ii = 0) = 1 - F(Zig), 
where F is the distribution function of a standard normal.  
In order to get consistent and efficient estimates, the model is estimated by 
maximum likelihood methods, taking as initial values the results of the estimation of 
Heckman (1979) selection model in two stages. In this context, the log likelihood for 
each observation i is 
        wi ln F([Zig  + (ln ai - Yib )r/s]/(1 - r
2)1/2) - (wi/2)([ln ai - Yib ]/s)
2 - wi ln(2p)
1/2s    if 
iÎL, 
li =  
        wi ln F(- Zig)  if iÏL, 
 
where r is the correlation coefficient between the random terms n and u, and wi is the 
blowing up factor for each unit that permits to go from sample to population 
statistics. Given that the N observations are assumed to be independent, the function 
to be maximized is 
   L(b , g , s rê a, Y, Z) = Si li.     
 (8) 
Provided that the selection of the Y and the Z variables ensures the model’s 
identification, the consistent estimation of the b  parameters and the availability of 
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the Y variables for all dwellings will allow the imputation of a monthly rent value to 
all units in the non-rental sector. 
Together with the physical attributes that determine the housing quality 
index, the geographical variables and the year of occupancy, the set Z includes the 
migrant condition of the household, measured in the EPFs by means of a question 
asking whether the household had moved into the current municipality before or 
after 1975 or 1985 in the 1980-81 and the 1990-91 case, respectively. According to 
Table 2, there are 18,487 non-rental units in 1980-81 and 18,180 in 1990-91. However, 
1,745 and 1,570 in these two periods lack information on building age, square meters 
or, above all, year of occupation.27 Therefore, only 16,742 and 16,610 non-rental 
dwellings, representative of 7,044,514 and 8,782,425 million population units have 
been considered in 1980-81 and 1990-91, respectively. Descriptive statistics about all 
variables considered in the market rental and the non-rental sectors are in Table 9.  
Table 9 around here 
In 1980-81, non-rental units seem to have more hygienic services, water, 
garage, and telephone facilities; larger size and, in spite of the fact that all market 
rental dwellings have been occupied after 1964 but there is a sizable proportion of 
non-rental ones occupied before that date, the latter are less old than the rental 
market units. Relative to owner-occupied and transferred units, rented dwellings 
seem to be more prevalent in more populated municipalities and in the group of 
provinces with higher stock prices in 2000. The differences in all these dimensions, 
                                        
27 As many as 1,648 and 1,557 are occupied as wages in kind or because a private or a public transfer. 
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however, are not very large. In 1990-91 the pattern is exactly the same, including a 
greater proportion of detached units with garden facilities in the non-rental sector. 
Not surprisingly, the proportion of migrant households living in rented 
accommodations is more that 4 times larger than those living in non-rental housing. 
Given that the migration status of the household does not appear as a determinant of 
housing rents, this is the variable that permits identification of model (7). The results 
of the estimation of model (8) in both years are presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 around here 
In 1980-81, but not in 1990-91, there is evidence that the sample selection bias 
must be corrected.28 Therefore, when the coefficients of the variables explaining 
market rents in Table 10 are compared to those obtained in Section III (see Model B in 
Table 5 for 1980-81 and Model C in Table 7 for 1990-91), the differences are larger in 
1980-81 than in 1990-91. Although the relative effect of all variables on market rents 
remain unchanged in both years, it is observed that the coefficients for the year of 
occupancy variables are slightly larger in absolute terms. This implies still larger 
discounts for sitting tenants in dwellings occupied before the sample year (compare 
columns 3 and 2 in Table 8 for 1980-81, as well as columns 5 and 4 in that same Table 
for 1990-91). 
 
V. HEDONIC ESTIMATES vs. SELFIMPUTED VALUES 
                                        
28 As pointed out in Table 10, in 1980-81 the hypothesis of independence (H0: p = 0) should be rejected for 
any confidence level below 99.25% (P-value = 0.0075). This is the case in 1990-91, but only for a 
confidence level below 82.6% (p-value = 0.1740). 
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As explained in the Introduction, for all non-rental units the EPFs record the 
monthly rent that an informer for the household occupying the unit thinks that 
his/her dwelling would command if it were rented in the market at the time of the 
survey. Answers to this question constitute what are called self-imputed rental 
values. 
Given the parameter vector b  estimated in the hedonic model (7), knowledge 
of the Yi variables for a non-rental unit i will suffice to produce an imputed rental 
value dependent on the year of occupancy. However, to have a comparable 
imputation to the self-imputed value provided by the occupant, it is necessary to 
compute the rental value that the unit would command at the survey time, that is, 
making the variable year of occupancy equal to 1980 and 1990 in the two samples for 
1980-81 and 1990-91, respectively. The resulting estimates will be referred to as 
hedonic rental values.29 
There are 13 and 4 non-rental units missing self-imputed values in 1980-81 and 
1990-91, respectively, that had to be eliminated from the comparison. The remaining 
18,474 and 18,176 units with complete information, representing 7,772,078 and 
9,602,498 population dwellings in 1980-81 and 1990-91, respectively, have been 
classified by the quartiles of the distribution of hedonic rental values. The frequency 
distribution of non-rental units by tenure mode and those quartiles are presented in 
the upper panel of Tables 11 and 12.  
Tables 11 and 12 around here 
                                        
29 There are 20 non-rental units in 1980-81 and 233 in 1990-91 without information on building age, as 
well as 62 in 1990-91 without information on square meters. These have been assigned the mean value of 
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In 1980-81 more than 50% of non-rental units are part of the owner-occupied 
market sector, while slightly more than 25% are public housing. The remaining 20% 
is equally divided between owner-occupied housing of unknown legal status and 
other units occupied as wages in kind or as a result of a public or a private transfer. 
In 1990-91 the distribution by tenure mode is very similar, with a slight increase in 
the percentage of public housing and owner-occupied of unknown legal status and a 
corresponding decrease of the market sector and the fourth tenure mode. In both 
years, public housing is over-represented in the third and the fourth quartiles, while 
the other three tenure modes are over-represented in the second and, above all, in the 
first quartile. 
The comparison between hedonic and self-imputed values takes two forms. In 
the first place, all units have been cross-classified by the quartiles of the two 
distributions. The middle panel of Tables 11 and 12 presents the diagonal terms of 
the corresponding contingency tables, that is, the percentage of units in each tenure 
mode that have been classified in the same quartile of the distributions of hedonic 
and self-imputed values.  Naturally, the greater those percentages are, the closer the 
ranking of units is according to the two criteria in the corresponding sector. In 
addition, the middle panel of those Tables includes the Spearman coefficient, a 
statistic that provides a synthetic, scalar measure of the degree of association 
between the two rankings.  
Generally, the agreement between the two classification criteria is somewhat 
better in 1980-81 than in 1990-91. For the non-rental stock as a whole, in these two 
                                                                                                                           
those variables in the tenure mode to which they belong. In this way, a housing quality index and an 
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dates the Spearman coefficient is 0.66 and 0.57, respectively. In both years, the 
percentage of units equally classified is greater in the quartiles I and IV; apparently, 
it is harder to agree upon the relative ranking of dwellings of intermediate quality. 
By tenure mode, the maximum agreement is achieved in the larger sector, namely, 
the owner-occupied market sector. The minimum agreement takes place in the public 
sector. This is not surprising, given the high number and large variety of public 
housing policies developed in Spain since 1950. Taking into account the fundamental 
difference between the “objective” statistical procedure followed to assign hedonic 
values and the “subjective” nature of the self-imputations suggested by the 
occupants, it can be concluded that, on balance, the degree of agreement between the 
rankings of the non-rental housing units according to the two classification criteria is 
quite satisfactory in both years. 
Beyond this ordinal analysis, the next question is about the differences in the 
mean values arrived at from the two routes. In the bottom panel of Tables 11 and 12 
the differences in percentage terms between mean hedonic and self-imputed values 
by tenure mode are presented for the entire non-rental sector and the quartiles of the 
distribution of hedonic rental values.  
In 1980-81, mean hedonic values are 10.6% greater than mean self-imputed 
ones. The proximity of mean values in the first two quartiles is truly remarkable, but 
the discrepancies are somewhat larger in quartile IV. Clearly, in this occasion the 
main difficulty lies in assessing rental values for public housing dwellings of greater 
than average quality. In 1990-91, mean hedonic values are 15.3% lower than self-
                                                                                                                           
hedonic value for them have been computed. 
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imputed ones. This time the largest differences are in quartiles II and III. This seems 
to be due to the discrepancies found with respect to owner-occupied units of 
intermediate quality and private or of unknown legal status. As a matter of fact, 
differences in mean values in these sectors reach 25.2% and 18.6%, respectively.30 
Unfortunately, there does not exist reliable statistical sources about housing 
prices at a national level prior to 1985.31 However, there is no doubt about the 
existence of a continuous increase in housing prices starting around 1985, a year 
before Spain became a full member of the European Union, that lasts until 1991, 
shortly before the beginning of a downswing in the general business cycle for the 
Spanish economy. Evidence about housing prices for new transactions in Madrid 
presented in Bover (1993), speaks of a previous boom around 1979. Based on such 
tentative evidence, it would appear that the sign of the difference between hedonic 
and self-imputed values might be influenced by the phase of the housing cycle in 
which the self-imputations take place: a downswing in the case of the EPF collected 
from April 1980 to March 1981, and at the very end of an upswing for the EPF 
collected from April 1990 to March 1991. 
Be that as it may, the important question is whether such differences are large 
or small for the purpose at hand. As explained in the Introduction, there are two 
ways to apply the rental equivalence approach to the determination of the weight 
that non-rental housing should receive in the CPI: using the evaluation by experts or 
                                        
30 Francois (1989) presents preliminary research within the BLS in the U.S. suggesting that owner 
estimates of implicit rents may be biased by as much 10% or 30% above actual values on average. 
However, he criticizes that research for underestimating spot rents, and points out that these results have 
not been confirmed by comparisons using data collector estimates. More importantly, using a sample of 
new tenants consisting of 3,706 observations in 27 different major metropolitan areas, this author shows 
that on average owner estimates are only lower than hedonic estimates by 1.4%. 
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occupants, or using the imputation obtained through hedonic methods. Therefore, in 
the context of this paper, the answer to the above question hinges on the implications 
for inflation of following either of the two versions of that approach.  
Inter-annual inflation rates, Pt, are computed using monthly CPI data 
according to the formula: 
  Pt = (CPIm,t - CPIm,t-1)/ CPIm,t-1, 
where CPIm,t and CPIm,t-1 are the value of the CPI in month m in years t and t – 1, 
respectively. In turn, the CPIm,t of the Laspeyres type with J commodities indexed by 
j = 1,…, J, is a weighted average of price relatives, (p j,m,t/pj,0), where pj,m,t is the 
price of commodity j in month m of year t, and pj,0 is the price of that commodity 
during the base period 0. That is, 
   CPIm,t = Sj Wj (pj,m,t/pj,0), 
where Wj, j = 1,…, J, is the set of official CPI commodity weights. The Spanish INE 
uses the 1980-81 and 1990-91 EPFs to estimate the weights Wj of the CPI system based 
in 1983 and 1992, respectively: each commodity j is assigned a weight Wj equal to the 
ratio of the population expenditures on that commodity to the population total 
expenditures on all commodities. Since the INE publishes the price relatives 
(pj,m,t/pj,0) for certain commodity breakdowns, it is possible to use the EPFs to 
                                                                                                                           
31 Bover (1993) contains a discussion of available statistical sources. 
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estimate a list of weights in order to reproduce the official inflation or to provide 
interesting alternatives.32 
Among other classifications, in 1983 the INE uses a commodity breakdown with 
J = 57, where commodity 35 includes two main items: a “non-rental housing services” 
component, whose official weight is estimated using the self-imputed rental values 
declared in the 1980-81 EPF by these dwellings occupants; and a second component 
mainly consisting of “housing repair and maintenance”. Excluding secondary 
housing, for which as explained in Section II no quality index has been computed, 
our own estimates based on self-imputed values of the weights given to non-rental 
housing services and commodity 35 are 9.4% and 13.5%, respectively.33 The estimates 
obtained with the hedonic values are 10.4% and 14.5%. Inter-annual inflation rates for 
these two alternatives, as well as the corresponding mean annual inflation for the 
entire period August 1985 to December 1992, are presented in the upper panel of 
Table 13. The differences are small (of the order of 0.03% per year). Therefore, 
whether we use self-imputations or hedonic values in assessing the importance of 
non-rental housing services in the CPI has a small impact on the measurement of 
inflation. 
As an alternative, consider the possibility of abandoning the two versions of the 
rental equivalence approach. This means dropping altogether the non-rental housing 
services component from the CPI-as the Spanish INE did officially in the 1992 base. In 
this case, commodity 35’s weight becomes 4.6%. As can be seen in column 5 of Table 
13, the mean inflation rate for the 1985-1992 period of the non-rental housing services 
                                        
32 For a thorough attempt in this direction in the context of a discussion of the Boskin Commission 
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component is almost 3 percentage points below the mean inflation rate for the 
economy as a whole. Therefore, as can be seen in column 3 in Table 13, inflation rates 
are now significantly lower than before. The differences with the rental equivalence 
approach are of a considerable order of magnitude. In particular, abandoning the 
rental equivalence approach represented by the hedonic alternative would have led 
to a bias in inflation of 0.33% per year during the 1985-1992 period (see column 4 in 
Table 13). For comparison purposes, recall the Boskin Comission’s view that when all 
sources of bias are considered the official CPI in the U.S. suffers from an estimated 
upward bias of 1.1% per year. 
Table 13 around here 
In 1992, the INE uses a commodity breakdown with J = 57 where, apart from 
other minor changes relative to the 1983 base system, commodity 35 includes only 
housing repair and maintenance, local housing taxes and other items pertaining to 
non-rental housing, but excludes all imputations for non-rental housing services. In 
order to estimate the inflation rates that would be obtained if the rental equivalence 
approach were applied in the 1993-2000 period, there is no difficulty in creating an 
additional commodity 58 whose weight can be estimated using the hedonic or the 
self-imputed rental values for non-rental housing. The sum of the weights for 
commodities 35 and 58 in the hedonic and the self-imputed cases is 15.6% and 17.0%, 
respectively, while the weight of commodity 35 in our version of the official system 
is 4.8%.34 In the absence of an official price index for commodity 58, the index for 
                                                                                                                           
findings in the Spanish case, see Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999). 
33 The official values are 10.33% and 13.61%, respectively. 
34 The official weight itself is 5.30.% For a discussion of the reasons why our estimate differs from the 
official one, see chapters 2 and 3 of Ruiz-Castillo et al. (1999). 
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commodity 33, “rents paid in rental housing”, has been used. The estimates of the 3 
series of inflation rates, as well as the information about the evolution of commodity 
33’s prices, appear in the lower part of Table 13. Again, the differences between the 
two versions of the rental equivalence approach are small (about 0.05% per year). 
However, the downward bias incurred when the official system is used rather than 
the hedonic one is 0.38% per year –a considerable order of magnitude. 
The conclusion is inescapable. The two versions of the rental equivalence 
approach lead to comparable inflation rates in both periods. Relative to this option, 
dropping non-rental housing services from the CPI considerably reduces the weight 
this sector receives in the price index and leads to a sizable bias in the measurement 
of inflation, whose sign depends on the evolution of the price of housing services 
relative to the CPI as a whole. During the 1985-2000 period, in Spain this bias has 
been approximately 0.35% per year in absolute terms. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The treatment of non-rental housing in the CPI is an old topic in index number 
theory and practice. The issue requires a solution to two problems: (i) how to 
determine the weight that non-rental housing should have in the CPI, and (ii) how 
non-rental housing prices should be monitored over time. This paper is an empirical 
contribution to the first question using the 1980-81 and 1990-91 household budget 
surveys for Spain that have served to determine the official CPI weights for the 1983 
and 1992 base, respectively. 
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The starting point is the economic approach to price index numbers for 
consumption goods and services, according to which a zero inflation rate means that 
the cost of a given standard of living has remained constant. As far as housing is 
concerned, the standard of living depends on the consumption of the housing 
services a dwelling provides regardless of the tenure mode in which the dwelling is 
held.  The empirical problem addressed in this paper is how to impute a rental value 
to the flow of housing services provided by the non-rental housing stock in the base 
period. The CPI weight for such services will then be equal to the ratio of the 
imputed value to the total household expenditures in all commodities (including the 
non-rental housing services in question). 
From a methodological perspective, the hedonic imputation method advocated 
in this paper has introduced two improvements upon the traditional procedure. 
First, Multiple Correspondence Analysis is used to select the linear combination of 
physical attributes that accounts for the maximum variance in this multiple-
dimensional space for the entire housing stock. It has been shown that this scalar 
index can be interpreted as combining those aspects of the physical attributes that 
contribute to housing quality. It is claimed that using this housing quality index in 
the explanation of market rents presents several advantages over the usual 
alternative where all physical attributes are included as separate regressors. Second, 
this paper has recognized the possible interdependence between the choices of 
tenure mode and housing characteristics. To correct for the possible selection bias 
caused by systematic differences in housing characteristics between the market rental 
sector and the non-rental housing stock, a Heckman procedure has been used for the 
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first time in this context. In this way, the estimated coefficients of the variables 
explaining market rents can be safely used to impute a rental value to non-rental 
housing units. 
The more remarkable result of the paper is that the hedonic values thus 
obtained through an “objective” statistical procedure are not that different from the 
self-imputed values “subjectively” selected by the occupants. Hedonic values are 
less dispersed and, on average, 10% higher and 15% lower than the self-imputed 
ones in 1980-81 and 1990-91, respectively. Such differences do not lead to important 
departures in average annual inflation rates for the 1985-2000 period.  
Fully liberalized and large rental housing markets are complex institutions 
where a highly differentiated commodity is rented for a price summarizing the value 
of the services provided by a large set of housing characteristics. In the Spanish case, 
the market rental sector only represents 8.9% and 5.3% of permanently occupied 
residential housing in 1980-81 and 1990-91, respectively. This small rental sector, 
which is still partly regulated, works under the influence of a rent controlled and a 
publicly subsidized rental sector. On the other side of the spectrum, a dominant non-
rental sector represents 71.1% and 85.0% of the housing stock in 1980-81 and 1990-91, 
respectively. Under these conditions it would appear that, whatever its conceptual 
merits, the rental equivalence approach to the determination of a CPI weight to non-
rental housing services is bound to fail in practice. However, the experiment 
performed in this paper has shown that two radically different imputation 
procedures lead to very close inflation rates during a 15 year period. Thus, in spite of 
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a thin market rental sector and against all odds, occupants of non-rental housing in 
Spain and hedonic procedures arrive, on average, to comparable imputed values.  
What is the explanation? On the statistical side, it should be emphasized that 
hedonic methods to explain rents and prices in rental and stock housing markets 
have been working reasonably well for 30 years in a variety of institutional scenarios. 
As this paper has shown, what is needed for these methods to also work in countries 
like Spain is simply large samples and good information on housing characteristics, 
legal status and year of occupancy. On the other hand, it seems that people are 
keenly aware of how housing markets work, so that self-imputed rental values –
although more dispersed than hedonic ones- do contain useful information.  
Finally, it should be emphasized that the aim of the exercise is simply to assess 
the weight that a given commodity should be assigned in a large commodity space. 
Tolerable differences in the numerator of the expression for determining that weight 
need not lead to significant differences in the magnitude of the weight itself. From 
this point of view, it is not so surprising that the two methods studied in this paper –
or a combination thereof that has not been attempted here- lead to similar solutions 
in terms of inflation rates for the economy as a whole. This means that even in a priori 
unfavorable circumstances, like those of Spain, as long as good data is available it 
should be quite possible to find an acceptable solution to the problem at hand.  
There is no room in this paper for a proper discussion of how the prices of non-
rental housing services should be monitored over time. However, the treatment of 
quality change, as well as depreciation and aging bias in both rental and non-rental 
housing sectors is bound to rely on hedonic methods (see, inter alia, Randolph 1988, 
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Hoffman and Kurz 2001, and Silber 1999).35 The results of this paper, that add to a 
successful literature, show that these methods are worth pursuing. 
This paper contains a warning for the specialists in the housing sector, the 
officials in charge of these matters, and public opinion in general:  in a country like 
Spain with a large non-rental housing stock, eliminating its services from the CPI has 
been estimated to give rise to a 0.35% per year bias in the measurement of inflation. 
Given the alternatives, this is an unnecessarily crude form of dealing with a difficult 
problem. It appears that there is room for national and international statistical offices 
to keep experimenting within the sound economic approach assumed in this paper. 
It might not be otiose to end insisting that, together with good data, the successful 
development of this approach requires a staff capable of applying multivariate 
statistical techniques. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
This Appendix has two parts. Part A is devoted to a summary of the essentials 
of Multiple Correspondence Analysis, or MCA for short. MCA is a descriptive 
technique for representing contingency tables, that is, tables consisting of the 
frequencies with which a set of values of two or more qualitative variables appear in 
a data set (see Tenenhause and Young 1985, and Greenacre 1984 for a detailed 
treatment of MCA). Part B contains an application of MCA to the data on housing 
attributes coming from the 1980-81 and 1990-91 EPFs. 
 
A. A Description of MCA 
                                        
35  This is also the case in the more promising version of the user cost approach as exemplified in 
Linneman and Voight (1991) and Crone et al. (2000). 
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Assume there are N observations on housing units, each one characterized by Q 
physical attributes, indexed by q = 1,…, Q, and possibly correlated. Let Jq be the 
number of categories or modalities of variable q, and let J = Sq Jq be the total number 
of categories with N >> J. The data can be represented by a (N x J) matrix Z, whose 
element zij takes the value 1 when housing unit i has modality j and zero otherwise, i 
= 1,…, N and j = 1,…, J. Note that since each housing unit can only have one of the Jq 
categories of variable q, the row sums in Z must all be equal to Q, i. e. Sj zij = Q for 
each i = 1,…, N. Denote by Nj the absolute frequency of category j, or the sum of 
elements in column j, Si zij = Nj, so that for each variable q, SjÎIq  Si zij = N. Finally, Si 
Sj zij = N Q. 
The objective of MCA is to obtain a set of uncorrelated variables wk, indexed 
by k =1,…, K, with K < Q, where each wk is a linear combination of the J categories. 
In other words, the objective of MCA is to find a (J x K) matrix M where mjk is the 
contribution of the j-th category to the new variable wk, so that the information in the 
original data can be expressed through the lower-dimensionality (N x K) matrix W 
defined by 
   W = Z M, 
whose columns are the wk variables. As will be seen in Part B of this Appendix, the 
first variable w1, which will be interpreted as a housing quality index, explains a 
large part of the variance in the data. 
The matrix M is constructed as follows. Denote by F the relative frequency 
matrix, i. e. F = (1/N Q) Z. The average column profile is the (N x 1) vector r = F 1J 
with ri = 1/N for all i = 1,…, N, while the average row profile is the (J x 1) vector c = 
FT 1N with cj = (Nj /N Q) for each j = 1,..., J. The corresponding (N x N) and (J x J) 
diagonal matrices are denoted Dr and Dc, respectively. Define the (N x J) matrix E by 
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   E = Dr-1/2 (F – r cT) Dc-1/2. 
The element ejT ej in the diagonal of the (J x J) matrix ET E is the c2 distance between 
the j-th column profile in matrix F and the average column profile r, weighted by its 
relative frequency cj.36 The sum is called the total inertia, TI, and it can be shown to 
be equal to (J/Q) – 1, i. e. TI = Sj ejT ej = (J/Q) – 1.  
MCA computes the singular value decomposition of E, say U DaVT, where U 
and V are orthogonal matrices, and Da has J – Q non-zero eigenvalues. In practice, 
since N >> J, it is more convenient to compute the singular value decomposition of 
the diagonal matrix ET E, say ET E = G DlGT, where Dl = Da2. The eigenvalues of Dl 
quantify the inertia projected through each of the associated eigenvectors (which 
form the columns of G). The eigenvectors represent orthogonal directions of 
projection of centered column profiles. The direction of the first eigenvector 
associated to the largest eigenvalue is the optimal projection in the sense that it is the 
linear orientation that collects the maximum disparity between individuals according 
to the Q variables. The second eigenvector is orthogonal to the first one and 
represents the linear orientation that captures the maximum residual disparity not 
taken into account by the first projection axis. The remaining eigenvectors can be 
similarly interpreted until the total inertia is accounted for by K orthogonal axis with 
K £ J – Q. In geometric terms, a change of axis is being performed where the original 
space of profiles that has dimension J – Q is projected in a reduced space with 
dimension K. The coordinates used in the projection are contained in the (J x K) 
matrix M defined by 
   M = Dc-1/2 G Dl1/2. 
For each k, the eigenvalue lk represents a percentage of the total inertia, but 
these percentages tend to be small and show a pessimistic idea about the proportion 
of the projected inertia by each axis. Thus, Benzécri (1979) proposes considering 
                                        
36 There is an analogous interpretation for the elements ej ejT in the diagonal of the (J x J) matrix E ET that 
refers to the rows. 
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solely the relevant P axis, that is, the axis associated with those eigenvalues with lp > 
1/Q, p = 1,…, P, and P £ K. Analogously, he proposes to correct the eigenvectors 
with the transformation 
   lpc = [Q/(Q – 1)]2 [lp - (1/Q)]2 
and show the proportion of inertia explained in relation to Sp lpc.  In this way, the 
dimensionality of the original matrix is reduced from J – Q categories to P indicator 
variables losing a small quantity of information. Once the importance of each 
indicator is evaluated in this manner, its interpretation can proceed in terms of its 
correlation with all initial variables and the weight that each category receives in the 
corresponding linear combination. 
 
B. An Index of Housing Quality 
In 1980-81, there are Q = 8 qualitative variables and J = 23 categories, while in 
1990-91 Q = 18 and J = 52. The number of observations with complete information 
along these dimensions is 23,898 in 1980-81 and 20,799 in 1990-9137, representing a 
population of 9,992,051 and 11,105,215 housing units, respectively. (See Table A for 
the frequency distribution of all physical attributes in both years). 
The percentage of inertia accounted for by the first two factors is 86.2% and 
12.1% in 1980-81, and 73.2% and 10.5% in 1990-91.Moreover, variables with two or 
more categories show a parabolic structure when depicted in the plane defined by 
those two factors. This is a very frequent phenomenon, known as the Guttman effect 
(see Grenacre 1991), which simplifies the interpretation. Indeed, this effect reveals 
that whereas the first factor summarizes the order structure of all modalities, the 
second factor shows an opposition between extreme categories (low frequency) and 
average ones (large frequency) of a variable. Thus, in the sequel the analysis will 
continue in terms of the first factor that contains the relevant information about the 
variability among housing units as far as their physical attributes is concerned. 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 In 1980-81 there are 73 observations without information on building age, while in 1990-91 this 
number is 289, plus 67 dwellings without information on housing size in squared meters. 
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Relative to the initial number of variables and categories, this constitutes a very 
drastic simplification indeed. 
The correlation between the first factor and each of the Q physical attributes for 
both years is shown in Table B. Among the 8 common variables, hygienic services 
and water facilities are the most influential. Telephone, building age and heating 
facilities occupy an intermediate position above garage and housing size, while 
having electricity is the most prevalent characteristic in both years and the one with 
the smallest correlation with the index whose meaning is being discussed. Except 
hygienic services and water facilities, the remaining 6 common variables gain some 
importance in the determination of the index in 1990-91; for instance, the correlation 
coefficient of garage increases from 0.41 in 1980-81 to 0.58 in 1990-91. Nevertheless, 
having an elevator or air conditioning inside the house, or having sport facilities and 
other community services around it, are the characteristics with the largest correlation 
coefficients with the index in 1990-91. 
Table B around here 
In each year, each modality j receives a certain weight mj, which can be positive 
or negative, but the more frequent a modality j is, the closer to zero mj will be. Table 
C presents the rankings of modalities in both years in terms of normalized weights 
mj’ that preserve the sign and the ratios of the original weights. The normalization 
consists of assigning the values – 10 and 10 to the modalities with extreme mjs 
according to the formula 
mj’ = mj (10/m*), 
where m* = max {| m1|,…, | mJ|}. In both years, the maximum normalized weight is 
below 10, indicating that there is no modality that plays the exact opposite role to the 
one that reaches the maximum negative value – 10. 
Table C around here 
As far as the interpretation of the index is concerned, it is very revealing that 
for all variables with two categories, the worst one receives a negative weight while 
the best one receives a positive one. For the remaining variables with 3 or more 
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categories, weights are always naturally ordered from worst to best modality. In 
particular, the categories with the maximum negative influence in both years are 
having no hygienic services, no water (or only cold water), or no light. Moreover, the 
first two are highly correlated with the index (see Table B), which indicates that both 
of them are very influential in the interpretation. Among the remaining common 
variables in both years, having a telephone, being in a building less than 11 years old, 
and having a garage or more than a full bathroom are categories associated with high 
and increasing positive weights. In 1990-91, where there are 10 more variables, 
having a swimming pool, elevator, electric energy or natural gas for cooking, and a 
sports area are the modalities exercising the maximum positive weight in the index. 
Other aspects worth noticing when comparing the two years are as follows: 
1) In 1980-81, to have any kind of heating system has a weight of 2.79 and not 
to have it detracts only – 1.73. In 1990-91, the range of variation goes from only 0.22 to 
– 3.62. Moreover, the correlation between the variable and the index goes from 0.59 in 
1980-81 to 0.65 in 1990-91. The interpretation is that “heating” is a less frequent 
commodity in 1980-81 than in 1990-91, so that its possession leads to a high relative 
weight, while its absence is the feature that makes its presence felt more forcefully in 
1990-91. 
2) Having or not having a telephone plays the same pattern in both years: in 
1980-81 the corresponding weights are 2.29 and – 2.17, while in 1990-91 the weights 
are 1.14 and – 3.27. 
3) In both years, having a garage plays a stronger positive role than not having 
it, but more so in 1980-81 (3.47 versus – 0.68) than in 1990-91 (2.41 versus – 1.02). 
However, the correlation coefficient between this variable and the index increases 
from 0.41 in 1980-81 to 0.58 in 1990-91. 
In our opinion, both the correlation between the index and the different 
variables and the way the weights received by worst and best modalities are 
naturally ordered for all variables without exception, indicate that the first factor 
obtained from MCA can be safely interpreted as an index of housing quality. The 
index values assigned to each housing unit as a function of its specific categories and 
the weights just analyzed, indicates the positive or negative deviation relative to the 
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quality attributed to the “average housing unit” with the more frequent categories, 
whose index value is zero by construction. The common categories associated to the 
average housing unit in both years are the following: building age between 20 and 30 
years, presence of electricity facilities, one bathroom (although perhaps not a full 
one), hot water, between 61 and 90 m2, and without a garage. The average dwelling 
in 1980-81 does not possess telephone nor heating, while in 1990-91 it has both and it 
is situated in buildings with more than 3 floors, without an elevator, air conditioning, 
garden, swimming pool or sports area; gas is the fuel used for cooking and heating 
water, while for the remaining heating uses –served by mobile tools- this fuel is 
combined with electric energy. 
The housing quality index has, of course, several shortcomings. First, the 
index does not take into account the heterogeneity in the way that certain categories 
influence quality for different housing types. For instance, heating in the Canary 
Islands or Andalucía should receive a smaller weight on quality than in the North of 
the country. Although such differences could be recognized by computing a different 
index for each housing type, the resulting quality indexes will not be comparable 
across types. Thinking of the main aim of this paper, a single housing quality index 
has been computed.38 Second, the housing quality concept is restricted to the Q 
variables for which there is information in the EPFs. Judging from the existing 
hedonic literature on housing, there are several quality dimensions that are 
potentially important, such as how well preserved dwellings are, as well as basic 
neighborhood characteristics like pollution, safety, public transport facilities, and 
distance to the main centers of economic and recreational activity. 
In any case, the real issue is whether, with all its shortcomings, the housing 
quality index here constructed behaves well in explaining market rents –an issue 
covered in Section III of the paper. 
 
 
                                        
38 To limit the influence of this problem on the results, only the two categories “no heating” and “heating 
of any kind” have been considered. 
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Table 1. Permanent Residential Housing by Tenure Mode, and Secondary Housing. 
A Comparison of the EPFs with the Censuses (In  Thousand Units) 
 
 
 1980-81 EPF 1981 Census 
            
RESIDENTIAL HOUSING       %         % 
            
 
A. Permanent Housing 10,022 100.0 10,431 100.0  
  
I. Rental Housing 2,297 22.9 2,169 20.8 
II. Owner-occupied 6,928 69.1 7,629 73.1 
Owned Outright  5,380 53.7 5,764 55.2 
Being Paid  1,548 15.4 1,865 17.9 
III. Other     797   8.0     633   6.1 
Wages in Kind         219   2.2     322    3.1 
Transferred         578   5.8      311    3.0 
 
B. Secondary Housing     666                                   - 1,900                                     - 
          
 
 
 
 1990-91 EPF 1991 Census 
            
RESIDENTIAL HOUSING       %         % 
            
 
A. Permanent Housing 11,298 100.0 11,736 100.0 
  
I. Rental Housing 1,694 15.0 1,781 15.2 
II. Owner-occupied 8,789 77.8 9,194 78.3 
Owned Outright  7,504 66.4 7,361 62.7 
Being Paid  1,285 11.4 1,833 15.6 
III. Other     815   7.2     761   6.5 
Wages in Kind       134   1.2     189    1.6 
Transferred       681   6.0     572    4.9 
 
B. Secondary Housing 1,284                                  - 2,923                                    - 
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Table 2. Permanent Residential Housing by Tenure Mode and Legal Status in the 
EPFs.  
Sample and Population Statistics  
 
 
 1980-81 EPF 1990-91 EPF 
            
SECTOR Sample Population % Sample Population % 
            
 
I. RENTALHOUSING* 5,484 2,297,105 22.9 2,975 1,694,184 15.0 
 
   1. Market Sector 2,181        888,945   8.9   1,061      601,970   5.3   
   2. Rent Controlled     968        405,290   4.0      229      129,968   1.1 
   3. Public Housing  1,787        773,164   7.7      771      426,875   3.9 
   4. Unknown Legal Status     535        223,795   2.2      914      535,371   4.7 
 
II. OWNER-OCCUPIED 16,427 6,928,150  69.1 16,623 8,789,287 77.8 
 
   5. Market Sector 9,307   4,104,814 41.0   9,132   4,883,659 43.2  
   6. Public Housing 5,316   2,048,206 20.4   5,222   2,676,098 23.7  
   7. Unknown Legal Status 1,804       775,130   7.7   2,269   1,229,530 10.9  
 
III. OTHER 2,060      798,911    8.0 1,557     815,038    7.2 
 
TOTAL 23,971 10,024,166 100.0 21,155 11,298,509 100.0 
                                                                                                          
 
* This sector includes 13 sample observations, representative of 5,911 housing 
units at the population level, that cannot be classified in the market or the rent 
controlled sector because they lack information on the year of first occupancy. 
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Table 3. Frequency Distribution and Mean Monthly Rent (in euros) for Physical 
Attributes, Geographic Characteristics, Years of Occupancy and Quality Index In The 
Market Rental Sector According to the 1980-81 EPF 
 
    
Physical Attributes Population Mean Years of Population Mean 
 Distribution Rent Occupancy Distribution Rent 
Sample Size 867,627 = 100.0% 33.8 
1. Hygienic Services 
Hyg1 = Less than a full bathroom 18.7 13.6 1. Ocup65   4.0 17.6 
Hyg2  = One full bathroom  69.1 33.3 2. Ocup66   2.4 15.4 
Hyg3  = More than a full bathroom 12.2 67.7 3. Ocup67   2.3 15.7 
2. Water Facilities  4. Ocup68   4.6 17.4 
Water1 = No water    3.9 11.7 5. Ocup69   3.9 20.8 
Water2 = Only cold water  23.8 16.9 6. Ocup70   7.5 24.0 
Water3 = Individual hot water  68.1 37.8 7. Ocup71   3.9 17.9 
Water4 = Centrally heated hot water   4.2 85.0 8. Ocup72   7.5 23.3 
3. Heating Facilities  9. Ocup73   7.2 22.1 
Heat1 = No heating  66.3 26.0 10. Ocup74 10.0 26.2 
Heat2 = Only mobile tools  19.9 34.3 11. Ocup75   8.7 29.9 
Heat3 = Fixed heating installation    13.8 70.6 12. Ocup76   6.6 35.7 
Heat12 = Heat1 and Heat2 86.2 28.0 13. Ocup77   6.4 35.7 
4. Garage Facilities    14. Ocup78   7.6 57.1 
No garage facilities  88.3 31.1 15.  Ocup79   9.8 65.7 
Garage   11.7 54.4 16. Ocup80-81   7.7 56.5 
5. Telephone Facilities     
No telephone 63.1 27.1 Ocup6573          43.3 20.5 
Telephone   36.9  45.3 Ocup7477 31.6               31.1 
6. Housing Size    Ocup7880 25.1              60.2 
Size1 = Less than 60 m2  18.7 22.8  
Size2 = 61 – 90  46.7 32.6 Ocup7480 56.7              44.0 
Size3 = 91 - 130  27.9 38.2  
Size4 = More than 130 m2     6.7 55.0  
7. Building Age 
Age1 = More than 50 years  26.6 19.2 
Age2 = 31 – 50  16.0 25.8 
Age3 = 21 - 30  10.6 31.3 
Age4 = 11 – 20  28.6  36.2 
Age5 = Less than 10 years  18.2  59.9 
    
Geographical Char. Population Mean Qindex Mean 
 Distribution Rent     Rent  
1. Municipal Size      Quartiles 
Mun1 = Less than 2,000     7.6 19.9 I -0.72 17.3 
Mun2 = 2,001 - 10,000  14.7 20.6 II -0.12 27.1 
Mun3 = 10,001 – 50,000  20.7 25.0  III  0.22 40.7 
Mun4 = 50,001 – 500,000  34.8  36.6  IV  0.65 71.3 
Mun5 = More than 500,000  22.2  51.3 
Mun45 = Mun4 + Mun5  57.0  42.3 Qindex6573 -0.15 20.5 
2. Mean Prov. Housing Price   Qindex7480 -0.09 44.0 
Prov11 = Below 860 euros/m2     5.5 26.8  
Prov22 = 861 - 1,230 euros/ m2  40.8 26.5 
Prov33 = 1,231 – 1,700 euros/m2 19.0 33.1 
Prov44 = Above 1,700 euros/ m2 34.7  44.0 
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Prov123 = Prov1 + Prov2 + Prov3 65.3  28.4 
            
Notes: 
1 Cáceres, Murcia, Badajoz, Lugo, Ceuta, Melilla 
 
2 Cádiz, Girona, Málaga, Segovia, Granada, Palencia, León, A Coruña, Almería, Soria, Toledo, Tarragona, Ávila, 
Guadalajara, Huelva, Valencia, Castellón, Huesca, Córdoba, Ourense, Alicante, Ciudad Real, Lleida, Cuenca, 
Albacete, Zamora, Teruel, Jaén, Pontevedra, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 
 
3 Burgos, Palma de Mallorca, Santander, Salamanca, Logroño, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Valladolid, 
Zaragoza, Oviedo, Sevilla 
 
4 Madrid, Barcelona, San Sebastián, Bilbao, Vitoria, Pamplona 
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Table 4 Regression Results. Classical Hedonic Models, 1980-81 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV 
Variables Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
  
Constant    2.1472    7.8   2.5537    9.8   2.7163 10.3 2.7772  11.1 
Hyg1 - 0.2912 - 4.8  -0.2410 - 4.5  - 0.2427 - 4.4 - 0.2457 - 5.0 
Hyg3    0.4259   6.3    0.3650   6.5      0.3751        6.7   0.3631    7.2 
Water1  - 0.5689 - 4.6 - 0.5127 - 4.1  -0.4975 - 3.9 - 0.5101 - 4.3 
Water2  - 0.2506 - 4.7  - 0.1847 - 3.8  - 0.1824 - 3.7 - 0.2340 - 5.2 
Water4   0.4851    3.9   0.3781   3.5   0.3503        3.2   0.2883    2.9 
Heat3    0.2871   3.4   0.2664   4.1   0.2578    3.9   0.2280    3.9 
Garage    0.1303   1.7    0.0934   1.4     0.0874    1.3   0.1422    2.6 
Phone - 0.0243 - 0.5    0.1221   2.9     0.1209    2.9   0.1128    3.0 
Lnsize   0.2494   4.2    0.2287   4.1    0.2388        4.2   0.2354    4.3 
Age -0.0039 - 6.2  - 0.0032 - 5.5  - 0.0032 - 5.4  - 0.0030   - 5.7 
Mun1  -0.4322 - 5.4  - 0.3835 - 4.5  - 0.3868 - 4.5  - 0.4073   - 5.0 
Mun2  -0.3492 - 5.8  - 0.2825 - 5.4  - 0.2856 - 5.4  - 0.2624   - 5.8 
Mun3 -0.3390 - 6.2  -0.3139 - 6.7  - 0.3131 - 6.8  - 0.2389   - 6.5 
Prov4  0.2598   5.4    0.2633   6.3     0.2708    6.4   0.2723     7.2 
Ocup65    - 0.9766 - 7.4    
Ocup66    -1.2100 - 9.9 
Ocup67    -1.1187 - 7.9 
Ocup68    - 1.0605 - 9.8 
Ocup69    - 0.8724 - 7.9 
Ocup70    - 0.7895 - 7.6 
Ocup71    - 0.8587 - 9.1 
Ocup72    - 0.8067 - 8.9 
Ocup73    - 0.7992 - 8.6 
Ocup74    - 0.6336 - 7.7 
Ocup75    - 0.4798 - 5.6 
Ocup76    - 0.3024 - 3.5 
Ocup77    - 0.2969 - 3.3 
Ocup78    - 0.2100 - 2.1 
Ocup79      0.0812    1.0 
Years6573          - 0.0400  - 3.5 - 0.0392  - 3.9  
Years7480          - 0.1149 -10.7 - 0.1275 -13.2 
Ocup6573          - 0.6450  - 4.7 - 0.7081  - 5.9 
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n 2,142 2,142 2,142 2,052 
 
Root MSE 0.7784 0.6916 0.6935 0.5799 
 
R2 0.361 0.499 0.493 0.586 
________________________________________________________________________  
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Table 5. Regression Results. Hedonic Models with the Housing Quality Index, 1980-
81 
     
 MODEL  A MODEL  B MODEL  C  
Variables Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
  
Constant  2.0187   18.6  1.7957  15.0  1.8974  17.5  
Mun1  -0.3702  - 4.6  -0.3779 - 4.6  -0.3783    - 4.9 
Mun2  -0.2844  - 5.3  -0.2876 - 5.4  -0.2558   - 5.7 
Mun3 -0.3078  - 6.5  -0.3042 - 6.5  -0.2245  - 6.1 
Prov4  0.2358     5.7   0.2367    5.7   0.2375     6.4 
Years6573 -0.0394  - 3.4  -0.0414  - 3.5  -0.0405  - 4.0 
Years7480 -0.1180 -11.1  -0.1151 -10.9  -0.1281 -13.3 
Ocup6573 -0.6937  - 5.0  -0.1815  - 0.8  -0.3786  - 1.9  
Qindex  0.7925  21.2 
Qindex6573     0.6789   11.2  0.7253   14.7 
Qindex7480     0.8800   20.2  0.8717   22.2 
           
 
n 2,142 2,142 2,052  
 
Root MSE  0.6994  0.6977  0.5844 
 
R2  0.482  0.485  0.578 
________________________________________________________________________  
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Table 6. Frequency Distribution and Mean Monthly Rent (in euros) for Physical Attributes,   
Characteristics, and Years of Occupancy and Quality Index In The Market Rental  
Sector According to the 1990-91 EPF      
       
Physical Attributes Population Mean    Population Mean 
  Distribution Rent    Distribution Rent 
       
1. Hygienic Services    10. Water Heating Fuel   
None or Outside the Dwelling 3,0 53,0  None 8,6 37,6 
One Full Bathroom the Dwelling 79,3 89,6  Solid (Wood, Coal, etc.) 1,9 71,9 
More than a Full Bathroom 17,8 171,3  Gaseous (Butane, Propane) 58,4 97,8 
2. Water Facilities    Liquid (fuel-oil) 4,1 212,0 
No Water 0,45 13,7  Electric Energy 18,4 90,4 
Only Cold Water 8,11 38,9  Natural Gas 8,6 185,0 
Individual Hot Water 85,16 104,6  11. Heating System Fuel   
Centrally Heated Hot Water 6,28 171,7  None 13,7 109,2 
3. Heating Facilities    Solid (Wood, Coal, etc.) 12,8 77,7 
No Heating or only Mobile Tools  77,9 85,3  Gases (Butane, Propane) 22,8 79,1 
Private Heating 15,6 156,7  Electric Energy 41,6 95,8 
Central Heating 6,5 187,9  Liquid (gas oleo, Fuel-oil) 6,2 192,8 
4. Garage Facilities    Natural Gas 3,0 283,4 
No Garage Facilities 81,2 92,8  12. Cooking Fuel   
Garage 18,9 147,2  Solid (Wood, Coal, etc.) 1,4 43,8 
5. Telephone Facilities    Gaseous (Butane, Propane) 81,8 91,8 
No Telephone 35,6 84,4  Electric Energy 7,4 155,8 
Telephone 64,4 113,4  Natural Gas 9,4 168,2 
6. Housing Size    13. Garden Facilities   
Less than 60 m2 18,9 85,8  None 91,5 101,8 
61-90 38,9 99,1  Garden 8,6 116,2 
91-130 30,1 105,4  14. Building Type   
More than 130 m2 12,2 136,5  Inferior Tenement 0,4 71,2 
7. Building Age    One Floor 18,7 63,0 
More than 50 years 29,3 81,4  Two Floors 6,4 75,3 
31-50 9,0 81,4  Three Floors or more 74,6 115,6 
21-30 26,5 87,3  15 Swimming Pool   
11-20 27,8 133,9  None 98,1 102,4 
Less than 10 years 7,4 155,6  Swimming Pool 1,9 135,5 
8. Elevator Facilities    17. Sports Area   
None 73,4 77,1  None 98,9 102,9 
Elevator 26,6 174,6  Sports Area 1,1 112,1 
9. Air Conditioning    18.Other Community Services   
None 98,2 102,2  None 51,1 69,9 
Air Conditioning 1,8 151,5  Some Community Services 48,9 137,7 
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Geographical Char. Population Mean  Years of Population Mean 
  Distribution Rent  Occupancy Distribution Rent 
       
1. Municipal Size    Ocup6575 29,20 6.796 
Mun1=Less than 2,000 3,0 53,0  Ocup7682  24,80 17.404 
Mun2=2,001-10,000 13,3 74,4  Ocup8390  46,00 23.575 
Mun3=10,001-50,000 23,6 88,5  Qindex Mean Mean 
Mun4=50,000-500,000 35,8 107,4  Quartiles Qindex Rent 
Mun5=More than 500,000 24,2 132,6  I -5,14 56,6 
    II -1,80 84,6 
2. Mean Prov. Housing Price   III 0,76 118,7 
Prov1=Below 860 euros/m2 5,2 62,8  IV 6,24 176,8 
Prov2=861-1,230 euros/m2 36,1 99,6     
Prov3=1,231-1,700 euros/m2 20,2 101,0  Qindex6575 -1,70 40,8 
Prov4=Above 1,700 euros/m2 38,5 112,7  Qindex7682 -0,27 104,6 
       Qind8390 0,05 141,7 
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Table 7. Regression Results. Hedonic Models with the Housing Quality Index, 1990-
91 
 
     
 MODEL  A MODEL  B   
Variables Coeff. t Coeff. t   
  
Constant   3.6176  21.4    3.9188  26.1   
Mun1  - 0.3993 - 2.4  - 0.3762 - 3.2 
Mun2  - 0.1965 - 1.9  - 0.2491 - 2.9 
Mun3 - 0.1483 - 2.2  - 0.1896 - 2.9 
Prov1 - 0.3453 - 3.1  - 0.3429 - 3.9 
Years6575 - 0.0747 - 3.9  - 0.0656 - 3.5 
Years7690 - 0.0056 - 0.4  - 0.0270 - 2.2 
Ocup6575 - 0.4605 - 1.0  - 0.8752 - 2.2 
Ocup7682 - 0.7911 - 2.4  - 0.7929 - 2.5 
Qindex6575   0.1220    8.3     0.1210    9.2 
Qindex7682   0.0987    4.9     0.0969    4.9 
Qindex8390   0.0754    9.0     0.0681    8.7 
         
 
n 1,035 982   
 
Root MSE  0.7545  0.6364 
 
R2  0.5070  0.5921 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8. Accumulated Discounts By Year of Occupancy as a Percentage of the Rent 
Paid In the Sample Year for a Dwelling of Average Quality, and Official Housing 
Inflation Rate (CPI Based in 1992) 
 
 Accumulated Discount, In % 
   
 1980-81 EPF 1990-91 EPF  
     
Year of  Traditional Qindex Regression Qindex Regression Housing  
Occupancy Hedonic Before After  Before After Inflation 
 Heckman Correction Heckman Correction Rate, In %      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
 
1965 70.1 71.3 74.3 82.3 83.5   - 
1966 68.9 70.1 73.1 81.1  82.4 7.9 
1967 67.7 68.8 71.8  79.9  81.2 8.9 
1968 66.4 67.5 70.4  78.5  79.9 6.8 
1969 65.1 66.2 69.0  77.0  78.5 1.3 
1970 63.7 64.8 67.5  75.5  77.0 4.87 
1971 62.2 63.4 65.9  73.8  75.4 5.9 
1972 60.7 61.8 64.3  72.0  73.7 5.1 
1973 59.1 60.3 62.5  70.2 71.9 10.3 
1974 53.5 53.6 56.3  68.1 70.0 12.9 
1975 47.1 47.3 49.8  66.0 67.9 14.0 
1976 40.0 40.1 42.4  51.6 54.6 11.0 
1977 31.8 31.9 33.9  50.2 53.1 13.4 
1978 22.5 22.6 24.1  48.9 51.6 12.6 
1979 12.0 12.0 12.9  47.5 50.0 13.5 
1980    46.0 48.3 12.1 
1981    44.6 46.6 13.3 
1982    43.0 44.8 12.1 
1983    17.2  20.3   8.6 
1984    15.0  17.7   5.6 
1985    12.6  15.0   6.7 
1986    10.2  12.2   7.5 
1987     7.8   9.3   5.2 
1988     5.3   6.3   6.5 
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1989     2.7   3.2   9.1 
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Table 9. The Market Rental Sector vs. The Non-rental Housing Stock: Differences in Physical Attributes, 
Geographic Characteristics, and Other Characteristics 
 
 1980-81 1990-91   
Physical Attributes Market Other Market Other 
 Rental Stock Rental Stock  
TOTAL 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 
1. Hygienic Services* 
Hyg1 = No bathroom inside the building   4.9   7.3   7.4   4.1 
Hyg2  = Less than one bathroom inside 13.9   8.0 74.1 68.9 
Hyg3  = One o more than a bathroom 81.2 84.7 18.5 27.0 
2. Water Facilities   
Water34 = Hot water 72.2 78.8 91.5 95.3 
3. Garage Facilities     
Garage 11.3  18.6   19.7  30.4   
4. Telephone Facilities     
Telephone 37.1  53.6  65.5 79.8 
5. Housing Size     
Size1 = Less than 60 m2 18.6      9.5 17.8   7.5 
Size2 = 61-90 46.5    40.0  39.4 36.2 
Size3 = 91-130 28.3    36.3  30.3 38.9 
Size4 = Less than 60 m2   6.6    14.2  12.5 17.4 
6. Building Age 
Age1 = More than 30 years 46.6  34.8    42.3 26.8 
Age2 = 11 – 30 41.0   41.7        53.1  58.6 
Age3 = Less than 11 years 12.4   23.5        4..6  14.6 
7. Building Type 
Detached = Detached House      18.1 38.9 
8. Garden Facilities 
Garden        8.5 16.5 
          
Geographical Characteristics   
         
1. Municipal Size          
Mun1 = Less than 2,000   7.6 12.9    2.9   8.3 
Mun2 =    2,001 – 10,000 14.6 21.0 13.1 20.0 
  
Mun3 = 10,001 – 50,000 20.5 21.0   23.9 22.6 
Mun45 = More than 50,000 57.3  45.1   60.1  49.1  
2. Mean Provincial Housing Price  
Prov1 = Below 860 euros/m2  5.5    7.2     4.7   6.7 
Prov2= 861- 1,230 euros/m2 40.6  45.2   37.0  45.0 
Prov3= 1,231- 1,700 euros/m2 18.6  18.4   19.8  17.8 
Prov4 = Above 1,700 euros/m2 35.3  29.2    38.5  30.5 
      
Other Characteristics 
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1. Years of Occupation      
ocup1 = More than 30 years    0.0 14.5     0.0 13.8 
ocup2 = 11-30   24.3 46.5   46.4 58.0 
ocup3 = Less than 11 years   75.7 39.0   53.6 28.2 
2. Migrant Household Head 
Migr75 = Arrived during 1975-1981 13.3   3.2 
Migr85 = Arrived during 1985-1991   12.9   3.4 
      
*In 1990-91: Hyg1= Less than a full bathroom; Hyg2= One bathroom; Hyg3= More than one bathroom. 
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Table 10. Hedonic Regression Models with a Selection Mechanism, 1980-81 and 1990-
91 
 
 
 1980-81 1990-91 
    
 Dependent variable: log rent  Dependent variable: log rent 
    
 Coeff. t Coeff. t 
 
Constant  2.0l35  16.6   3.8773 25.9 
Mun1  -0.4250  - 5.2 -0.4106 - 3.4 
Mun2  -0.2949  - 6.4 -0.2793 - 3.2 
Mun3 -0.2480  - 6.6 -0.2033 - 3.2 
Prov4   0.2520    6.8                   Prov1 -0.3712 - 4.2 
Years6573 -0.0471  - 4.4 Years6575 -0.0668 - 3.6 
Years7480 -0.1380 -13.4 Years7690 -0.0325 - 2.5 
Ocup6573 -0.4120  - 2.0 Ocup6575 -0.9067 - 2.2 
Qindex6573  0.6496  11.2 Ocup7682  -0.7750 - 2.5 
Qindex7480  0.7886 14.8 Qindex6575   0.1163   8.8 
   Qindex7682   0.0926   4.6 
   Qindex8390   0.0642   7.7 
      
Selection Mechanism  Selection Mechanism 
     
 Coeff. t Coeff. t 
 
Constant -153.63 -16.6 Constant -38.1483  - 5.1 
Hig1 -0.4688 - 4.9 Hig1    0.2149     1.7 
Hig3 -0.1085 - 1.5 Hig3  - 0.1698  - 3.0 
Water34 -0.2637 - 4.4 Garage  - 0.1100  - 1.9 
Garage -0.2271 - 3.1 Phone  - 0.4808  - 8.6 
Phone -0.4408 - 9.5 Size1    0.2787     3.6 
Size* -0.0038 - 6.1 Age***  - 0.0106 - 10.7 
Age1  1.4250  24.0 Detached  - 0.4432   - 6.6 
Age2  0.7870  14.4 Garden  - 0.0958  - 2.0 
Ocup** 0.0778  16.6 Ocup     0.0294     7.8 
Mun1 -0.5153 - 6.0 Mun1  - 0.3835  - 3.9 
Mun2 -0.4473 - 6.9 Mun2  - 0.2255  - 3.5 
Mun3 -0.2796 - 5.6 Prov1  - 0.0913  - 1.1 
Prov1 -0.2570 - 2.8 Prov2  - 0.0370  - 0.8 
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Prov2 -0.1272 - 2.4 Migr85     0.4130     5.3 
Prov3 -0.1154 - 2.1 
Migr75  0.5631    7.3 
  
r  0.214    2.8                     r  0.149    1.4 
Sigma 0.591   40.4                     Sigma 0.637    25.7 
n= 18,794                                     n= 17,804   
   
Wald test (r  = 0): Chi2(1)=7.15; Prob > chi2 = 0.0075     Wald test (r  = 0): Chi2(1)=1.85 Prob > chi2 = 0.1740 
_______________________________________________________________________  
* Size = m2 
** Ocup = year of occupation 
***Age = year of building 
 
Table 11. A Comparison of Hedonic and Self-imputed Rental Values for the Non-
rental Housing Stock, 1980-81 
  
 Frequency Distribution of the Non-rental  
 Housing Stock By Tenure Mode and 
 Quartiles of the Distribution of Hedonic Values  
TENURE MODE    
 ALL I II III IV 
Owner-Occupied 
   Market Sector 53.2 66.3 55.9 44.8 46.5  
   Public Housing              26.5   3.6 19.7 37.9 42.7 
   Unknown Legal Status 10.0 15.7 10.9   8.1   6.0  
Other                                10.3 14.4 13.6   9.2   4.8  
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
  
 
 Percentage of Units In Each Tenure Mode That 
 Have Been Classified In The Same Quartile  
 According To the Distributions Of Self-imputed  
 And Hedonic Values, In %  
    
TENURE MODE I II III IV Spearman 
     Coefficient 
Owner-Occupied    
   Market Sector 62.9 38.5 37.3 61.6 0.72  
   Public Housing               46.0 30.6 30.1 51.6 0.49 
   Unknown Legal Status 61.2 37.0 37.7 53.2 0.68  
Other                                62.0 31.6 37.3 53.5 0.65  
ALL 63.1 37.0 36.2 57.3 0.66 
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 Mean Monthly Rental Difference Between Hedonic and 
 Values (in euros) Self-imputed Mean Values, In % 
     
TENURE MODE Hedonic Self-imputed Total  Quartiles Of 
The Hedonic Values 
    I II III IV 
Owner-Occupied    
   Market Sector   54.2.  51.9   4.3    2.4      - 1.0   3.4    7.6 
 (31.9) (45.2) 
   Public Housing   73.3  57.8 21.2       - 2.2 9.9 20.6 24.0 
 (26.4) (35.4) 
   Unknown Legal Status   46.9  44.4   5.5       - 5.9 0.0 4.7 16.1 
 (26.8) (25.5) 
Other  46.1  41.5 10.0          6.0 4.5 14.8 13.4 
 (25.1) (34.3) 
ALL  57.7  51.6 10.6          6.1 2.7 10.1 14.1 
 (31.0) (41.1) 
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Table 12. A Comparison of Hedonic and Self-imputed Rental Values for the Non-
rental Housing Stock, 1990-91 
  
 Frequency Distribution Of The Non-rental  
 Housing Stock By Tenure Mode and 
 Quartiles of the Distribution of Hedonic Values  
TENURE MODE    
 ALL I II III IV 
Owner-Occupied 
   Market Sector 50.9 67.4 59.0 41.7 38.6  
   Public Housing              27.9   5.8 16.8 38.0 46.3  
   Unknown Legal Status 12.8 16.1 13.8 12.2   9.8  
Other                                  8.5 10.7 10.4   8.1   5.3  
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  
 
 Percentage of Units In Each Tenure Mode That 
 Have Been Classified In The Same Quartile  
 According To the Distributions Of Self-imputed  
 And Hedonic Values, In %  
    
TENURE MODE I II III IV Spearman 
     Coefficient 
Owner-Occupied    
   Market Sector 54.8 36.8 33.3 56.2 0.61  
   Public Housing              41.9 27.4 30.2 47.4 0.46 
   Unknown Legal Status 55.3 34.2 33.9 53.1 0.60  
Other                                50.1 33.4 33.4 53.2 0.51  
ALL 54.9 32.1 30.0 53.5 0.57 
   
 
    
 Mean Monthly Rental Difference Between Hedonic and 
 Values (in euros) Self-imputed Mean Values, In % 
     
TENURE MODE Hedonic Self-imputed Total  Quartiles Of 
The Hedonic Values 
    I II III IV 
Owner-Occupied  
   Market Sector   147.5   184.8 - 25.2  - 11.1    - 24.8 - 29.9 - 29.4 
   ( 70.1) (166.0) 
  Public Housing   191.8            195.9   - 2.2  - 22.4   - 8.9   - 5.3     1.4 
   ( 63.5) (122.5) 
  Unknown Legal Status 146.6   173.9           - 18.6  - 12.4 - 23.7     
 (63.9) (127.2) 
Other   140.7            149.8              - 6.5   - 5.9   - 8.4 - 10.5 
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   (59.3)  (128.8) 
ALL  159.2            183.5            - 15.3  - 11.4 - 20.2 
 ( 69.7)  (147.7) 
   
 
Table 13. Inter-annual Inflation Rates and Mean Annual Inflation Rate for 1985-1992 
and 1993-2000 (Percentage Points Per Year) 
 
 Treatment Of Non-rental Housing 
Base = 1983 Services In The CPI:   
   
 Rental Equivalence Excluded 
 Approach From CPI 
     
  Non-rental 
 Hedonic Self-imputed Housing 
 Imputations Values  (4) = Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) – (3) (5) 
               SUBPERIODS        
August1985 - December1985 2.82 2.84 3.05 -0.24 0.62 
1986 8.26 8.30 8.66 -0.40 4.47 
1987 4.63 4.66 4.89 -0.26 2.09 
1988 5.91 5.89 5.77  0.13 7.26 
1989 6.92 6.91 6.84  0.08 7.76 
1990 6.61 6.62 6.78 -0.17 4.95 
1991 5.61 5.60 5.55  0.06 6.23 
1992 5.41 5.44 5.69 -0.28 2.63 
Mean Annual Rate,  
August 1985 – December 1992 9.26 9.29 9.58 -0.33 6.45 
  
 
 Treatment Of Non-rental Housing 
Base = 1992 Services In The CPI:  
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 Rental Equivalence Excluded 
 Approach From CPI 
     
  Non-rental 
 Hedonic Self-imputed Housing 
 Imputations Values  (4) = Prices 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) – (3) (5) 
               SUBPERIODS        
January 1993 – December 1993 4.41 4.47 3.92  0.49 8.23 
1994 4.40 4.41 4.33  0.07 4.92 
1995 4.52 4.56 4.26  0.26 6.48 
1996 3.78 3.85 3.23  0.55 7.85 
1997 2.56 2.62 2.05  0.50 6.09 
1998 1.76 1.80 1.39  0.36 4.20 
1999 2.97 2.98 2.88  0.09 3.56 
2000 3.99 3.99 4.00 -0.01 3.89 
Mean Annual Rate,   
January 1993 – December 2000 4.19 4.24 3.81  0.38 7.19 
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Table A. Frequency Distribution for Physical Attributes, 1980-81 and 1990-91 
Physical Attributes 1980-81 1990-91  
Sample Size 9,992,051 = 100.0% 11,105,215 = 100% 
1. Hygienic Services 
None or Outside the Dwelling   7.6    1.8   
One Full bathroom Or Less 77.3  73.3   
More Than A Full Bathroom 15.1 24.9  
2. Water Facilities  
No Water   3.8    0.4    
Only Cold Water 19.4    5.1  
Cold and Hot Water 76.7  94.6   
3. Heating Facilities   
No Heating 61.6  10.9  
Mobile Tools, Ind. or Central Heating 38.4  89.1   
4. Garage Facilities     
No garage  83.6    72.3   
Garage   16.4    27.7  
5. Telephone Facilities     
No telephone  49.3 22.7  
Telephone    50.7  77.3 
6. Electricity 
No Electricity     0.9    0.2 
Electric Facilities   99.1  99.8  
7. Housing Size     
Less than 60 m2  12.7    9,0   
61 – 90 m2  41.6 37.8  
91 – 130 m2  33.4 37.4   
More than 130 m2   12.3 15.8   
8. Building Age 
More Than 50 Years  25.5 11.3  
31 – 50 Years  27.7   13.6 
21 – 30 Years  11.5   25.0  
11 – 20 Years   11.0    33.4 
Age5 = Less Than 11 Years   24.3    16.7 
9. Elevator Facilities 
None       70.3 
Elevator       29.7 
10. Air Conditioning 
None       97.6 
Air Conditioning          2.4 
11. Water Heating Fuel 
None         5.4 
Wood, Coal         2.1 
Gas       59.8 
Electric Energy       16.2 
Natural Gas       16.6 
12. Heating System Fuel 
None       10.9 
Wood, Coal       19.4 
Electric Energy       40.6 
Natural Gas       16.0 
13. Cooking Fuel 
Wood, Carbon         3.4 
Gas       76.8 
Electric Energy          6.8 
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Natural Gas       13.0 
14. Garden Facilities 
None       84.9 
Garden       15.1 
15. Building Type 
Inferior Tenement         0.3 
One Floor       35.6 
Two Floors         4.6 
Three or more Floors       59.5 
16. Swimming Pool 
None       98.8 
Swimming Pool         0.2 
17. Sports Area 
 None       98.9 
 Sports Area         1.1 
18. Other Community Services 
None       52.7 
Some Community Services       47.3 
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Table B. Correlation Between the First Factor Obtained by MCA and the Physical 
Attributes, 1980-81 and 1990-91 
 
 
Physical Attributes 1980-81 Physical Attributes 1990-91 
 
1. Hygienic Services 0.76 1. Other Community Services 0.83 
  
2. Water Facilities 0.75 2. Elevator 0.80 
 
3. Telephone Facilities 0.62 3. Air Conditioned 0.80 
 
4. Building Age 0.59 4. Sports Area 0.78 
  
5. Heating Facilities 0.41 5. Building Type  0.73 
 
6. Garage Facilities 0.41 6. Cooking  0.72  
     
7. Housing Size 0.40 7. Hygienic Services  0.72 
 
8. Electricity 0.26 8. Water Heating Combustible 0.71 
     
  9. Water Facilities 0.70 
 
  10. Telephone Facilities 0.69 
 
  11. Building Age 0.68 
 
  12. Heating Facilities 0.65 
 
  13. Garden Facilities 0.62 
 
  14. Garage Facilities 0.58 
 
  15. Heating System 0.57 
    
  16. Housing Size 0.49 
   
  17. Swimming Pool 0.40 
    
  18. Electricity 0.33 
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Table C. Ranking of Normalized Category Weights In the First Factor Obtained By MCA, 1980-81 and 1990-
91 
 1980-81 1990-91   
Categories Weights Categories Weights 
 
No Electricity  - 10.00 No Water - 10.00 
No Water    - 8.41 No Electricity   - 8.72 
No Hygienic Services     - 8.09 No Hygienic Services    - 8.32 
Only Cold Water    - 4.21 No Water Heating System    - 7.16 
More Than 50 Years of Age    - 3.25 Only Cold Water      - 6.94 
Less Than 60 m2    - 2.59 Wood, Coal for Cooking      - 4.97 
No Telephone    - 2.17 Inferior Tenement     - 4.91 
No Heating    - 1.73    More Than 50 Years of Age     - 3.66 
31 – 50 Years of Age    -1.49 No Heating      - 3.62 
No Garage Facilities    - 0.68 Less Than 60 m2     - 3.27 
21 – 30 Years of Age    - 0.22 No Telephone     - 3.27 
One Full Bathroom     - 0.07 One Floor Building  - 2.93 
Electricity      0.09 30 – 50 Years of Age  - 2.82 
61 – 90 m2     0.36 No Community Services     - 2.44 
11 – 20 Years of Age     1.08 Wood, Coal for Heating    - 2.25 
91 – 130 m2     1.43 21 – 30 Years of Age    - 2.01 
Cold and Hot Water     1.49 Two Floor Building    - 1.93 
More Than 130 m2     1.65 No Elevator    - 1.82 
Telephone  2.29 Gas For Heating - 1.35 
Less than 11 Years of Age      2.67 No Garage     - 1.02 
Mobile, Ind. or Central Heating      2.79     One Bathroom - 0.98 
Garage      3.47  Gas For Water Heating - 0.89 
More Than A Full Bathroom      4.34 Elevator - 0.81 
  10 – 20 Years of Age - 0.81 
  Gas For Cooking - 0.69 
  61 – 90 m2 - 0.33 
  No Air Conditioning - 0.08 
  No Sports Area - 0.05 
  No Swimming Pool - 0.04 
  No Garden - 0.01 
  Electricity    0.01 
  Garden    0.04 
  Electric Energy for Heating    0.15 
  Mobile, Ind. or Central Heating    0.22 
  90 – 120 m2    0.32 
  Cold and Hot Water    0.32 
  Electric Energy For Water Heating    0.41 
  More Than 1202    0.81 
  Telephone    1.14 
  Less Than 11 Years Old    2.14 
  More Than Two Floors    2.21 
  Garage    2.41 
  Natural Gas Heating    2.65 
  Some Community Services    3.16 
  Air Conditioning    3.29 
  More Than One Full Bathroom    3.41 
  Gas For Water Heating    3.65 
  Electric Energy For Cooking    4.46 
  Swimming Pool    4.69 
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  Elevator    4.69 
  Natural Gas for Cooking    5.19    
  Sports Area    5.49 
